Let us recall, if necessary: Serbia is a candidate for EU membership, and alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is part of Chapter 31 in the accession negotiations. This alignment is not a mere formality—it is a demonstration of solidarity with European partners, a coordinated response to global challenges, and a way to build credibility as a reliable and responsible actor. In the current international context, aligning with the CFSP means taking a clear stance against aggression and repression, and affirming that European values are also our own.
Conversely, non-alignment with the CFSP has tangible and negative consequences. It slows down the pace of accession negotiations, jeopardizes access to EU financial and technical assistance (including the Growth Plan), and prevents participation in joint EU missions and initiatives—such as the civilian missions we often praise. Furthermore, it undermines the trust of EU member states that assess our progress, and trust is a currency in short supply.
For years, the ISAC Fund has been closely monitoring Serbia’s alignment with EU decisions and declarations in the field of foreign policy. The trend is clear: the alignment rate is declining—from last year’s 59% to this year’s 52%. Political calculations and geostrategic interests evidently take precedence over assumed obligations. Cynics may argue that “nowhere does it say” candidates must align 100%—but if that’s the case, why is Serbia closer to Georgia than to its regional neighbors in terms of alignment?
Out of 123 EU declarations and measures, Serbia aligned with 64, and failed to align with 59. Thematically, non-alignment most often concerns declarations related to Russia and Ukraine—indicating a continued policy of balancing despite Russia’s aggression. Serbia also failed to align with EU positions on Iran, Moldova, Venezuela—revealing inconsistency in supporting democratic values—as well as on human rights, cyber security, and chemical weapons. This raises questions about genuine commitment to international norms.
Such a level of non-alignment cannot be explained by technical reasons alone. On the contrary, it points to a deep strategic ambivalence within the Serbian government. While it declaratively supports EU membership, in practice, key foreign policy decisions are made with greater concern for not offending Moscow or Beijing than Brussels. The Kosovo issue is often used as a convenient excuse, even though many declarations are unrelated to the dialogue.
As a result, Chapter 31 remains one of the most problematic, and Serbia’s credibility as a candidate is further compromised. The EU increasingly emphasizes that alignment is not a formality, but a test of political will. Serbia, however, demonstrates that sovereignty in decision-making is more important than solidarity with European partners. In a state of deep political crisis, Belgrade remains at a crossroads between East and West—but in reality, is drifting further away from the European path.
Marko Savkovic