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The deadliest month for civilians in Ukraine: Russian tactics of “combined strikes” the key reason? (24. 6. 2026.)
Marko Savković from the ISAC fund tells Euronews Serbia that these data are devastating. Firstly, that the war has been going on for so long, and secondly, that civilians are dying in that number and that there are no indications that the conflict is coming to an end. “I think that the suffering of civilians in armed conflicts is one of their determinants in the modern world. We have one disproportion. More and more civilians are suffering. It should be the other way around, the more sophisticated the weapons, the easier it should be to establish the difference between civilians and combatants. But, as we can see, that is not the case, partly because they are civilian targets. So, both sides are simply targeting civilian infrastructure, with the difference that, I would say, Russia has been for a long time is resorting to that one tactic that could essentially be called an attempt to instill fear by targeting Ukrainian territory by targeting residential buildings and facilities. Sometimes it is about, let’s say, failures or a situation in which a certain military target is surrounded by civilian infrastructure. But, regardless, the laws of war, customs and laws of war require the establishment of a difference between those two things,” said Savkovic.
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What did Trump say about Iran in Evian, and what is the position of other leaders about Ukraine: Savković on topics from the G7 summit (17. 6. 2026.)
“The agreement is certainly on shaky legs. There is no trust between the two parties. Months have passed in attempts to find a solution,” said Savković. He reminded that the naval blockade was successful, but it came with a high price, and that the Iranian nuclear program was not stopped, nor were the missile capacities destroyed. “Trump mentioned how the naval blockade was successful, that is true, but it came with a very high price. At the same time, it was not destroyed, Iran’s nuclear program was not stopped, and the country’s missile capacities were not destroyed either,” Savković pointed out. CNN released a draft of the 14-point memorandum that made no mention of Iran’s renunciation of its ballistic arsenal and proxies in the region. “Iran absolutely has the capacity to rebuild that arsenal. There is also no mention of what is happening in South Lebanon . It is a conflict in which Israel and Hezbollah are, a conflict that is taking place on land, in which soldiers are participating and there are no indications, even Netanyahu made a statement in that context that Israel remains in South Lebanon because it has to do it for its own security. So we already have one, I would say, big problem, which is not covered by this memorandum and which will demand, it simply has to to require a kind of pressure from the United States on Israel as the biggest ally,” warned the guest of the ISAC Fund. |
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Is China Vucic’s saving grace? (7. 6. 2026.) Igor Novaković said, I don’t see any dramatic progress in China’s relationship with Serbia, although many expected it. In certain circles in Belgrade, rumors were circulating that there would be some new spectacular loan or new large projects. What has been announced is certainly significant, but I don’t see it as a major departure from the current trend. So I’m not sure about any new heights. I would characterize it primarily as a typical vocabulary of Chinese diplomacy, full of pompous phrases that don’t mean much in practice. |
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What was the intention of the group that was deported from Montenegro to Serbia? (4. 6. 2026.) “Considering who left and how these people left, I think it goes without saying that this was an attempt by the authorities in Serbia to show that the president enjoys great support beyond the borders. So, that he is a regional leader,” concludes Marko Savković. He estimates that the goal of their “political agitation” was to “distract attention from the gathering where the focus should actually have been on Montenegro and Montenegrin success (around European integration and the organization of the summit).” |
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Savković: It is clear that the government does not want to bring Serbia into the EU (3. 6. 2026.) “The (European) Commission now recognizes that the reality here is different compared to some other countries that are also candidates for EU accession. Because Serbia has really fulfilled a small percentage of what it committed to,” Savković said. Asked whether, based on everything, the current government even wants to bring Serbia into the EU, Savković concludes – no. “I think it is completely clear that the government does not want to bring Serbia into the EU. Everything is relative in politics, but we have too much evidence that says they do not want to,” Savković concludes. |
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Serbia and China: Can new agreements be a brake on EU accession (26. 5. 2026.) 23 documents were signed – memoranda of understanding, letters, programs in areas ranging from economy to ecology, technological development and media, which Vučić says will “change the face of Serbia”. “Most of these are lower-level agreements that open up possibilities for future cooperation,” says Novaković. “They are also a kind of testing ground,” he adds. Novaković was particularly interested in the agreements on the joint implementation of four global initiatives, and cooperation within the Global Security Initiative (GSI). “The four global initiatives are China’s attempt to restore ‘faith’ in multilateralism under Chinese leadership. “Since Donald Trump became US president again, China has been trying to position itself as a reliable partner that believes in international law, and this is a kind of challenge for America,” says Novaković. |
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Old fears, deeper vulnerabilities – The new defence pacts in the Western Balkans (18. 5. 2026.) In a recently published study, which examined the two defence pacts as well as rising military spending in the Western Balkan countries, the Belgrade-based International and Security Affairs Centre (ISAC Fund) identified three possible scenarios: Integration, where the region gradually joins EU and NATO frameworks and tensions ease; Fragmentation, where emerging blocs strengthen and rivalries intensify; and Controlled competition, marked by increased militarisation with limited coordination but no open conflict. |
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Turkey remains one of Pristina’s most important partners and that, by all indications, this is unlikely to change. Asked whether Ankara is directly supporting Kurti with this move ahead of the elections, Savkovic said that Turkey views the matter differently. “Ankara claims that it is trying to maintain good relations with both Belgrade and Pristina and to act constructively. However, in Belgrade, the intensive cooperation between Turkey and Pristina, especially in the field of defense, is not viewed favorably,” he pointed out. |
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Igor Novaković, a senior associate at the Center for International and Security Affairs, said that two factors should be taken into account, namely the high level of trust in the army and the experience of the 1999 bombing, which created collective frustration and fear (that something like that would not happen again). “I will remind you of 2014 or 2015, when we received a donation of Russian and Belarusian MiGs, which were already 30 years old at the time, but since we had planes that were expiring, we had to do something, so we took the planes that Russia had grounded, until we could buy a new multi-purpose plane. However, there was a whole campaign in the media with those MiGs, first six of them, then four more from Belarus, as if it was a big step forward. What I want to say is that even then the discussion was thrown out of the rational sphere and into propaganda.” |
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Marko Savković, senior advisor of the Center for International and Security Affairs (ISAC Fund), tells NIN that it should first be investigated whether these congressmen are at the same time lobbyists paid by the Kosovo government for some reason. According to him, decisions in NATO, like decisions on membership, are made by consensus. Savković believes that the initiative for Kosovo to become a member, especially at this moment, is, first of all, not realistic, because NATO is now going through a kind of uncertainty, because it is not known what the US intends to do with the alliance. “Under Trump, we see that, despite all the efforts of Secretary General Mark Rutte, little by little we have some statement that introduces instability. This is not the moment when NATO is looking in the direction of expansion and new members,” assesses Savković. He recalls the fact that Slovakia, Romania, Greece and Spain, as members of NATO, do not recognize Kosovo, which still remains an insurmountable obstacle on the way to Kosovo becoming a member of that alliance tomorrow. |
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Changes in Hungary increase concerns about NIS: can a job already completed fail (15. 4. 2026.) NIN’s interlocutor believes that Viktor Orban was important, but primarily as a mediator, as someone who could provide political support for the whole thing. “Peter Magyar is positioning himself as a pragmatic politician as far as I can see, he talks about the need for Hungary to protect its energy interests, he wants to negotiate with Moscow… He is not ‘to the left’ of Orban, on the contrary, he just does not have the baggage of a corrupt politician, and corruption is what erodes the national interest and voters have finally recognized that,” Savković draws attention. NIN’s interlocutor reminds that Hungarians have previously had a bad experience with the transaction between MOL and the Croatian company INA, which negatively affected relations with Zagreb. Savković states that the Hungarian made a statement to the Croatian media in the context of the need for “normalization and learning from mistakes.” “Serbia’s interest remains to preserve the refinery in Pančevo, and there has been speculation for some time that MOL does not really need it. So, jobs. I do not believe that the product itself will be worse, although Gazprom’s gas stations were at the top in terms of quality and range of offerings,” Savković analyzes. |
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Suspicious timing suggests a false flag operation on the Serbian-Hungarian border (7. 4. 2026.) Marko Savković, Senior Advisor at International and Security Affairs Centre (ISAC Fund), says for EWB that many of his colleagues have already labelled this incident as the so-called “false flag operation”. “I really do not know whether it is a false flag incident or not, but the timing is too suspicious or convenient – depending on from whose perspective one looks at. In any case, it is dangerous, because the credibility of Serbia will suffer further internationally, particularly within the EU. Also, it is a bit frivolous case, as we had two press conferences where Director of VBA spoke, after he had stayed out of the public eye for years. He obviously addressed the public to fix the damage. All in all, it was unnecessary”, Savković states. He stressed that, at the same time, “somehow, everyone who monitors the situation in Europe has already been prepared that something like this can happen”, including the warnings coming from Tisza (Hungary’s main opposition party). |
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EU rearmament tests stability and trust in the Western Balkans (9. 3. 2026.) Serbia’s high defence spending, joint exercises with China and complex arms deals have raised questions about the country’s long-term geopolitical alignment. Serbia has one of the region’s most ambiguous foreign policies, working with Russia and China while remaining an EU candidate. Its defence budget is also the highest in the Balkans, at €2.2 billion annually. In a further sign of this ambiguity, the country has shipped over €800 million worth in arms to Ukraine, despite maintaining close ties with Moscow. Similarly, Serbia conducts joint exercises with China and purchases most of its weapons from Beijing, including drones and missile-defence systems. But it also purchases Rafale fighters from France, financed by French banks, and has significant arms deals with Israel. This complexity leaves the EU uncertain about where Serbia stands. “Are these systems purely defensive or have an offensive capacity as well?” asked Marko Savković, a senior advisor at the ISAC Fund, a Belgrade-based think tank. |
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Speaking about the indirect consequences of the Middle East conflict for the countries of the Western Balkans, he stresses that the economic effects will be felt very quickly. “The Strait of Hormuz has been closed, oil pipelines disrupted, strikes on oil terminals… That represents a large share of global trade in petroleum products. Prices will rise. The increase is not yet that large, but we will see how it affects other prices. Usually a rise in prices follows, and then inflation,” he explained. |
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Marko Savkovic of the ISAC Fund told Kosovo Online that the Middle East conflict does not pose a direct risk to Western Balkan countries, noting that previous diplomatic tensions between Tirana and Tehran are unlikely to escalate further. The main risk, he said, will be economic consequences—especially inflation and rising fuel prices. Savkovic said that expanding the conflict onto the territory of U.S. allies would constitute state terrorism, which would provoke a reaction from the European Union, which would expect Western Balkan countries to follow its position. He also noted that among the countries of the region, only Albania has had open disagreements with Tehran. “I do not believe the Western Balkans itself is directly threatened. The only country that had a very concrete reason for conflict with Iran was Albania. Albania expelled a group connected with the regime in Tehran. Iran responded with a cyberattack, which was one of the most serious cyber incidents in this region. But beyond that, I do not currently see further escalation,” Savkovic said. |
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Marko Savković, a Senior Advisor of the International and Security Affairs Centre (ISAC Fund), remarks for EWB that the Law on Foreigners “will put the Serbian community in Kosovo under great pressure, and complicate their everyday life”. “Once again, this step is aimed at abolishing one more factor of Serbia’s presence in Kosovo, under the veil of the establishment of the rule of law. There are only the remnants (of Serbian institutions), and Kosovo will not be stronger or more successful after this law is implemented, but from the point of view of those who support the Government of Prime Minister Kurti, it will be a success. In the end, it is all that counts”, Savković notes. |
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U.S. withdrawal from Kosovo: Trump’s message to Europe, risk to regional stability (25. 2. 2026.) Marko Savkovic of the ISAC Fund stated that there is a possibility the U.S. could reduce its military presence in Kosovo, but that KFOR would continue to operate through troop reorganization and greater participation by other countries, potentially including some from the region. “It seems to me that at this moment there are several options. One is for KFOR to continue as it currently exists, with clearly defined zones of responsibility and without major changes in composition. The second, if Americans were indeed to leave, would likely require certain countries to compensate for their presence. There are countries naturally interested in doing so,” he said. Speaking about the current U.S. administration, Savkovic noted that its focus has shifted compared to Trump’s first term and that the Western Balkans is no longer among top priorities. “Priorities of the U.S. administration constantly change; it is much less predictable in its conduct. It is quite clear that, unlike during Trump’s first term, this region is not in focus to the same extent,” Savkovic said. |
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What would the loss of the Oil Industry of Serbia mean for Russia? (24. 12. 2025.) Savković states that the position Russia has in the national oil company of Serbia means that “you can influence the economic situation, and indirectly the political situation in the country, with your actions.” “The infrastructure that NIS has is part of Serbia’s critical infrastructure. Therefore, it is important for Serbia’s national security,” he added. In addition, Serbia, despite taking steps to diversify its gas supply, still remains predominantly dependent on Russia for this energy source. “You have a situation where one country has a decisive influence on your energy supply. That is a position that no country can be comfortable with, hence the huge effort being invested in diversification,” says Savković. |
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Marko Savkovic of the ISAC Fund nevertheless notes that the economic capacities of Western Balkan countries are quite limited to speak of a major arms race at this point. “An arms race—I would say yes and no. Yes, because it is clear and evident that everyone is arming themselves to some extent, modernizing systems, purchasing new equipment or replacing outdated ones. Thus, we have countries that are NATO members and are, to a degree, obliged to do so, as well as countries that are either militarily neutral or aspire to belong to an alliance and, for those reasons, seek to arm themselves. On the other hand, it is not an arms race in the true sense, because I believe the economic capacities of Western Balkan countries are still too limited to speak of a major arms race,” Savkovic said. |
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Serbia has not complied with the new European Union restrictions on Russia (8. 12. 2025.) According to an analysis by the ISAC Fund, Serbia has not complied with 63 EU declarations and decisions relating to Russia since Russia’s attack on Ukraine. |
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Marko Savkovic from the ISAC Fund tells Kosovo Online that opening a regional Interpol bureau would bring Serbia professional and prestige-related benefits, but would not give Belgrade additional tools to influence Kosovo’s membership prospects. “From the perspective of the dialogue, voices from Kosovo speak of so-called strategic asymmetry—that Serbia would thereby gain a more favorable position relative to Kosovo,” he says. Nevertheless, he emphasizes that the benefits for Serbia are mostly professional and important for police cooperation, recognition of expertise, and international standing. “It is certainly a positive development. In general, we should strive for as many relevant international organizations and their regional bodies as possible to be present, represented, or even headquartered in the Republic of Serbia. We may take as an example the Berlin Process, where out of several regional bodies, only the Transport Community ended up located in Belgrade,” he explains. He notes that, in the event of opening a regional bureau, Serbia would not gain any special rights enabling it to further complicate Kosovo’s path to Interpol. “These decisions are made by the General Assembly, so nothing significant would change. This is more important for Serbia in a broader sense, unrelated to Kosovo, and is vital in the context of political cooperation and the fight against cross-border crime, which is extremely important in the Balkans,” he concludes. |
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“By betraying Russia, Vucic would also betray his voters” (13. 6. 2025.)
The visit to Ukraine is not a step towards the West, but a continuation of balancing. Not signing the declaration condemning Russian aggression will not affect Serbia’s European path because it is not progressing anyway, Marko Savković from the ISAC Fund told “Vijesti”. |
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“Russia uses Vučić’s weakness to exert pressure” (31. 5. 2025.) Moscow criticizes Serbia for providing ammunition to Ukraine, as it assessed that Vučić is politically vulnerable after his visit to the Kremlin, Igor Novaković from the ISAC Fund tells “Vijesti”. |
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Messages in “Soviet style”: A stab in the back to the Kremlin or a life raft thrown? (31. 5. 2025.) Marko Savković, a senior advisor at the ISAC Fund, remarked to NIN that it is actually surprising that this situation had not already arisen long ago. “It is a public secret that ammunition from our factories, primarily intended for artillery, ends up on the Ukrainian battlefield, and that operations are running ‘around the clock’ to meet demand. Of course, the Russian side is well aware of this. They were informed, if not before, then in April 2023, when leaked information from the Pentagon emerged, including details regarding Serbian supplies of arms and military equipment to Ukraine,” Savković stated. |
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The messages that will be sent from those meetings are expected, and Igor Novakovic, research director of the ISAC fund, says that they will certainly be on the same level as those sent by the European Commissioner for Enlargement, Marta Kos, and the President of the European Council, Antonio Costa. He adds that we should also keep in mind that two topics are very important for Ms. Kallas. The first topic is the relationship of the European Union towards Russia and therefore the positioning of Serbia in the context of the sanctions that the EU has imposed on the Russian Federation and certainly in relation to the position of Serbia towards Ukraine. Another topic is the issue of dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. |
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Will there be repercussions from Vučić’s trip to Moscow? (9. 5. 2025.) Speaking about Vučić’s latest trip to the Russian Federation, Marko Savković, a Senior Advisor in the International and Security Affairs Centre (ISAC Fund), notes for EWB that he uses foreign policy as a tool to navigate internal politics, and that “it has always been that way”. “As the crisis in our country deepens and prolongs, Vučić seeks sources of legitimacy (political support) outside of it. For this purpose, he first travelled to the United States, but not only did such an attempt fail, but there are many open questions that we will seemingly be dealing with for a long time. With Russia, things are different: President Vučić has so far avoided gestures of extreme favor with Moscow, especially since the outbreak of war in Ukraine”, Marko Savković stresses. |
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Balkan horseshoe around Serbia (17. 4. 2025.)
Politically, as previously stated, it acted as a response to Tirana, Zagreb, and Priština. Igor Novakovic, director of the ISAC Fund (Center for International and Security Affairs), told NIN that it could also be interpreted as a message to official Zagreb, especially since Budapest has a series of tensions with Croatia, from historical to current economic and geopolitical issues. He also added that he believes the cooperation between Budapest and Belgrade had been arranged earlier and that it should be noted that the document signed by Priština, Zagreb, and Tirana is a declaration that has yet to be operationalized into any kind of agreement. |
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Although Igor Novakovic, director of the Institute for International and Security Affairs (ISAC Fund), believes that the cooperation between Budapest and Belgrade in this area was agreed upon earlier, he also states that it can be interpreted as a message to official Zagreb, especially given that Budapest has a series of tensions with Croatia, from historical disputes to current economic and geopolitical issues. According to him, it is important to note that the document signed by Pristina, Zagreb, and Tirana is a declaration that has not yet been operationalized into any form of an agreement. From Novaković’s perspective, it is likely more focused on sending a specific political message to Belgrade, as Croatia tries to assert itself as a regional player. |
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Speaking about the document signed by the Serbian and Hungarian ministers of Defense, Marko Savković, a Senior Advisor at International and Security Affairs Centre (ISAC Fund), states for EWB that “first of all, we have not seen the document, but know about it only what President Vučić said in his presentation”. Savković agrees that the document does not imply the creation of “a military alliance” between the two countries, since “there is no mention of the clause on mutual assistance, i.e. defense”. “I do not think that it can be interpreted as a ‘military alliance with a NATO member country’, either. First of all, it is not a military alliance, and, second, Hungary has long been an ‘outlier’ in the Alliance”, he remarks. In Savkovic’s opinion, it is clear that the “political closeness” between Belgrade and Budapest led to the strengthening of the ties in the domain of defense. |
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Do the mass protests in Serbia have a foreign policy dimension? (11. 2. 2025.) Igor Novakovic, Research Director of the International and Security Affairs Centre (ISAC Fund) states for EWB that in spite of the fact that “there is no doubt that some foreign countries could find their interest in what is happening in Serbia, I do not believe that these protests were initiated or systematically supported by anyone”. “The very nature of the protest is such that it is not directed by any actor, not even a domestic one. Here, in principle, we have what is called the ‘grassroots’ movement – which is very decentralized, which is without any grand plan, and which, in fact, is shaking the foundations of society itself. So, I do not think it can be classified as an attempt which is political to such an extent that it pursues someone’s interests”, Igor Novakovic says. |
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Vučić and Kurti in Brussels: Early to start, too late to finish (11. 12. 2024.) Although the meetings were held and the Brussels dinner was eaten, the interlocutors Kim Radio agree that it is too early for detailed projections of the directions of action of the new EU administration regarding relations with Belgrade and Pristina, that is, the dialogue between the two sides. “Don’t forget that the appointment of Miroslav Lajčak’s successor is yet to come. The European Union must now formulate a whole series of policies in view of Donald Trump’s return to the position of the US president, so they must also position themselves towards him now, and all these relations are breaking down in the Balkans as well. I would say that this was an initial examination of the terrain,” said Marko Savković. |
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Igor Novakovic from the International and Security Affairs Center (ISAC Fund), also believes that the practical prerequisites for a deeper cooperation between the two countries disappeared at the beginning of the war in Ukraine. “The hostile relations between the West and Russia have their consequences. The change may not be visible as a narrative, but cooperation has declined considerably compared to the period before 2022. First of all, some practical levers of influence that Russia used to have are now greatly reduced. With regard to the gas supply, an interconnector was built so Serbia now has the option to obtain gas from other sources as well. True, those sources do not have the capacity to replace the Russian ones, but they can be a deterrent mechanism for the potential use of Russian gas as a lever of pressure against Belgrade,” Novakovic points out. |
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From 1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024, Serbia aligned with 47% of EU foreign policy declarations, while other candidate countries in the region – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and North Macedonia – aligned with 100% of them. These are the results of the analysis of the International and Security Affairs Center (ISAC Fund), released yesterday. “Serbia has continued its alignment patterns with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 2024, similar to 2022 and 2023, when [it] had alignment rates of 48 per cent and 54 per cent, respectively”, ISAC analysis reads. |
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The experiences from Serbia regarding the problem of disinformation were shared by Nikola Petrović, Director of the International and Security Affairs Centre (ISAC fund). “Media illiteracy is a traditional value in Serbia,” emphasized Nikola Petrović, adding that with slight exceptions of some media, this reality has its own history that dates back for decades. He emphasized that Serbia is not only the recipient of foreign influences in the media sphere, but it is also a regional center for the further dissemination of such disinformation. He pointed to the offices of Russia Today and Sputnik in Serbia as proof of the strength of the Russian influence in Serbia. “Serbia and its political parties have such a close relationship with Russia that it is even difficult to reduce this level of closeness. This is the reason why Sputnik and RT are present in Serbia,” said Petrović. He added that due to media illiteracy in Serbia, media headlines with suspicious content have the highest number of clicks. The anti-Western campaigns in Serbia started at this level in 2008 after the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo, when Russia saw a huge opportunity to enter the Serbian media space. “This pushes Serbia as a self-isolated country that does not see its future in the EU and in Western society,” said Nikola Petrović from the ISAC fund. |