What Can Democracies Do?

According to data from V-Dem and Our World in Data, there are currently roughly equal numbers of autocracies and democracies in the world. Following the so-called third wave of democratization (which lasted from the 1970s through the 1990s), during which democracies became the dominant form of governance among states, we have spent the last decade witnessing democratic decline. In such a world, politicians who regard power as the fundamental principle of politics find numerous opportunities opening before them.

Autocrats do not necessarily seek chaos; chaos, after all, is bad for business. What interests them is order, or an international system in which states are only formally equal. At the same time, clearly defined spheres of influence are determined by the actions of major powers.

This is evident when Russia wages aggression against Ukraine; when the United States abducts the president of Venezuela while invoking the Monroe Doctrine (or the “Donroe Doctrine,” after Donald Trump); when Israel launches (preemptive?) attacks on neighboring countries in succession; and when China intercepts and disciplines Philippine vessels in international waters. In other words, “might makes right,” or, as the famous English expression goes, “the weak suffer what they must.”

At the beginning of this century, power was often legitimized through alliances and “coalitions of the willing.” That is no longer the case. Diplomatic forums still host discussions, but they no longer produce decisions or arrangements capable of calming regional crises. The European Union’s sanctions regime against Russia stands as an exception.

Another difference from the post-Cold War period is that the world has become genuinely multipolar. China and India can no longer be ignored. A number of regional powers, around which smaller states revolve, insist on strategic autonomy and are willing to pay the price for maintaining it, such as Turkey and Brazil. Their leaders, whether autocratic or not, suddenly enjoy more options and fewer reasons to remain tied to a single partner. Energy can be purchased from one country, weapons from another, and the technologies that make the difference in daily life, economic competition, and warfare from a third.

The crisis of democracy is also a consequence of the behavior of some of its leading representatives. In international affairs, principles of accountability and human rights are frequently subordinated to the interests of large-scale capital. Weapons are sold to authoritarian regimes despite war crimes; efforts to waive vaccine patents are opposed in order to protect pharmaceutical profits at the expense of the Global South; and the costs of the green transition are externalized through uncontrolled mining of rare minerals in poorer countries.

What matters here is not ideology, but rather the way politics is understood: whether it serves as an instrument for personal enrichment and the enrichment of a narrow circle of associates. This explains the similarities among various regimes, which cooperate because they share an interest in weakening independent institutions, media outlets, and regulatory bodies.

Anne Applebaum develops this argument further, claiming that autocrats do not seek formal alliances but instead aim to maintain and expand an “informal international network of like-minded actors” who use the state, or states, as a private resource. Channels of influence have long been established through lobbying for particular interest groups. These actors are connected by the ideology of money, business arrangements, energy projects, and the exploitation of natural resources.

At present, there is no better example than Donald Trump’s second administration. The boundary between American foreign policy and the private dealings of Trump’s inner circle has almost disappeared. While Marco Rubio conducts sensitive diplomatic negotiations, members of the president’s family, who simultaneously act as presidential envoys, conclude business deals with the governments and sovereign wealth funds of the very countries with which they are negotiating, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.

Such arrangements, involving hundreds of millions of dollars flowing into the private funds of Trump’s associates, constitute textbook examples of conflicts of interest. There is widespread suspicion, quite possibly justified, that concessions made by Washington and approvals for exports of sensitive technologies are linked to personal and corporate gain rather than the public interest.

The most tangible consequence is a crisis of trust among allies. Alliances function because the parties assume that each side will behave predictably over the long term. If that certainty disappears, alternatives are sought. This explains substantial investments in strategic autonomy, risk diversification through new trade connections, and efforts to reduce dependence on a single center of power. It is no coincidence that ideas once considered unimaginable, such as institutional ties between Canada and the European Union through associate membership or similar arrangements, are now being discussed more frequently.

The response of democracies, therefore, will involve a combination of power instruments, resilience-building, and international cooperation. They will rely on containment, with the European Union’s approach toward Russia serving as an example of a twenty-first-century adaptation of containment; deterrence, by signaling that the costs of aggression would far outweigh any benefits; and engagement, based on the belief that interdependence reduces the likelihood of conflict. The best-known example of this approach is Germany’s policy of Wandel durch Handel (“change through trade”) in its relations with Russia. Risk diversification, as part of the broader strategy of de-risking, also plays an important role, alongside the option of selective cooperation in areas of shared interest.

Finally, by promoting democratic governance, supporting democratic resilience, and advancing international norms through a return to a rules-based order, democracies can assert themselves against competing authoritarian regimes.

The fundamental long-term advantage of democracies lies in their capacity to generate legitimate institutions, social innovation, and trust. The search for a balance between security and values remains the key strategic challenge for democracies in the twenty-first century.

First published on the “Savremena politika” portal, 28 September 2026