



# An analysis of Serbia's alignment with the European Union's foreign policy declarations and measures: Annual review for 2021

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# An analysis of Serbia's alignment with the European Union's foreign policy declarations and measures: Annual review for 2021<sup>1</sup>

From January 1, 2021, to December 31, 2021, the European Union (EU) issued a total of 85 foreign policy declarations with which partner countries were requested to align. Of that total, the Republic of Serbia aligned with 52 declarations. This means that in 2021, Serbia's alignment rate was 61%. Given that its overall alignment rate for 2020 was 56%, Serbia currently has a slight improvement in alignment. The alignment rate stayed within an average range established since 2014. Namely, Serbia's lowest alignment rate was in 2017 - at 47%, and the highest in 2015 - 66%.

On the other hand, it is noteworthy that the alignment percentages are merely a descriptive category that indicates the general alignment trend, whereas the topics with which Serbia has failed to align with are essentially more critical. Foreign policy declarations and the measures contained therein may include a broad range of issues, and often not all of them are considered equally important to the EU and its member states. These topics include various issues, from imposing, amending, or renewing restrictive measures against certain countries to declarations concerning important international dates. Of course, the most important are those related to issues that are of direct concern for the security of the EU and its member states. Therefore, the EU and its member states closely monitor the alignment with crucially important issues for the Union and its proclaimed foreign policy objectives. In this context, the alignment of Serbia and other candidate countries is reviewed.

Also to note, many of the topics which the declarations address are not directly related to Serbia's interests; hence it is easier for Serbia to align with them, which in theory should allow for a greater alignment percentage.

As claimed by Serbian officials on several occasions, the main reason for the lack of alignment with the EU's foreign policy declarations and measures is the Kosovo issue and Serbia's specific position following the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. Since Pristina's unilateral declaration of independence in 2008, Serbia has improved its relations with many countries that do not recognize Kosovo, especially with Russia and China, both permanent UN Security Council members. On the other hand, as highlighted in the Bilateral Screening for Chapter 31, in the past, Serbia developed significant economic relations primarily with the Russian Federation, so any introduction of restrictive measures against Moscow would harm the Serbian economy.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, during the past year, officials have claimed that the fact that Serbia has avoided alignment with certain declarations, particularly those related to Russia, has been a wise decision, as Serbia would be facing problems, particularly in the context of the ongoing energy crisis.<sup>3</sup>

In any case, over the last decade, Serbia has consistently failed to align mainly with those foreign policy declarations and measures that were directly or indirectly related to the Russian Federation or the People's Republic of China or their respective foreign policy interests. During the meeting with the EU High Representative for Foreign and Security policy, Joseph Borell, the President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, announced that Serbia's alignment would improve during

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1) The analysed declarations are from the online portals of the European Council and the Council of the European Union, [www.consilium.europa.eu](http://www.consilium.europa.eu). In other words, all publicly announced declarations that had a provision on alignment of third countries were subject to the analysis.

2) CFSP and CSDP: Institutional/organisational framework and structure, Chapter 31 –Foreign, Security and Defence Policy, Serbia Bilateral Screening, Brussels, October 10, 2014, p. 6

3) These statements were frequent in particular before and after president Vučić's meeting with Putin in November 2021 regarding the renewal of the long term Natural Gas Supply Agreement. The outcome of the meeting was that Serbia got natural gas deliveries under same prices for next six months - until April 2022.

2021. Indeed, throughout the year, the alignment percentage has increased to over 60 percent, as Vučić promised Borell. The most apparent movement was vis-à-vis several topics, such as Myanmar/Burma, Guatemala, and Belarus.

Of the total of thirty-three declarations that Serbia has failed to align with, seventeen refer to the Russian Federation and the armed conflict in Ukraine, four to Belarus, three on the People's Republic of China, and two on EU mechanism for imposing restrictive measures on serious human rights violations and abuses, as well as on cyber issues, and one each on Venezuela, Congo, Burundi, Syria, and Libya. Below we will look at some of these declarations that Serbia has failed to align with.

When it comes to declarations vis-à-vis Russia, most of the declarations were related to Russia itself and only a smaller portion to the armed conflict in Ukraine. In terms of the Ukraine conflict, the EU issued one declaration marking the 7<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol, on the 7<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the downing of the Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 over the territory of Ukraine that the EU considers as illegal and a serious violation of the international law. The EU also renewed the restrictive measures imposed by Decision no. 145 of the EU Council from 2014 and one time amended it with the additional declaration. In addition, Serbia also did not align with the restrictive measures imposed by the EU Council's Decision no. 119 and the ones imposed with the Council's Decision no. 386 from the same year regarding the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol. All renewed restrictive measures are directed towards entities and Russian citizens and officials or individuals and entities from Ukraine that the EU considers connected to Russian actions in this state.

In the previous year, the EU issued the most significant number of declarations dealing with the Russian Federation itself. Four declarations are protests against the arrest of Russian opposition politician, Alexei Navalny, upon his return to Russia, his subsequent sentencing to jail which the EU sees as unjustified and biased (which was supported by the European Court of Human Rights in 2017), deterioration of his health in the penal colony where he is serving his sentence, and finally against the ruling of a Moscow Court which labelled Navalny's organization as "extremists groups." This is a continuation of the EU's firm position regarding the Kremlin's treatment of Navalny and other opposition leaders and parties in the past. Serbia did not align with any of the declarations regarding Navalny.

The EU also used its Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime to react against Navalny's treatment and imposed sanctions against four senior Russian officials close to President Vladimir Putin, which will be discussed below. However, Russia responded by imposing entry bans on eight officials from EU states, including members of the European Parliament and the European Commission, which the EU condemned through a declaration and protested against the grounds and justification regarding this decision. Two declarations are related to the deterioration of relations between Russia and the Czech Republic due to the discovery of illegal activities by Russian military intelligence, GRU, which perpetrated explosions at the Vrbětice ammunition depot in 2014 in the Czech Republic. With the first declaration, the EU strongly supported the actions of the Czech Republic, and with the second condemned Moscow's listing of the US and the Czech Republic as unfriendly states that "have carried out unfriendly actions" against Russia, Russian nationals, or Russian entities.

Local and regional elections in Russia were also a topic of one of the EU declarations Serbia did not align with. On this occasion, in September 2021, the EU protested against Russia's decision to restrict the size and format of an international OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission, which prevented its deployment. In the same declaration, the EU protested against the actions of the Russian regime against the opposition, civil society, and independent media and actors that resulted in the shrinking of space for their engagement.

The EU also issued a declaration in protest to the Russian kinetic direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon test, which has been successful, as the Russian missile destroyed one of their

own Russian satellites. With this, Russia showed that it could successfully bring the theatre of war to space. The EU's position is that this action is against the UN principles and will jeopardize the free access to and use of space for all States for many years.

Finally, the EU issued a declaration regarding the *Ghostwriter* malicious cyber activities that some EU member states have associated with Russia and called upon the Russian Federation to adhere to the norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace.

In addition to these, one of the declarations on cyber issues is also connected with Russia, as the EU expressed its solidarity with the US on the impact of the SolarWinds cyber operation<sup>4</sup>, for which the US designated Russia as the responsible side. The EU is a strong promoter of globally responsible behaviour in cyberspace and its codification in the UN. Serbia did not align with this declaration either. Serbia also did not align with the renewal of the EU Council's decisions to establish a framework for targeted restrictive measures to deter and respond to significant effects that constitute an external threat to the EU or its member states. Initially, Serbia has aligned with the framework in 2019. However, with the subsequent EU Council's decisions, the restrictive measures have been applied against entities and individuals from the People's Republic of China and Russian Federation, and Serbia thus avoided aligning. This is the case with this newest declaration as well.

As for China, in 2021, the EU issued two political declarations, and Serbia avoided aligning with both. Both declarations are related to the situation in Hong Kong. The first one from January 7 was associated with the mass arrest of 50 people in Hong Kong, a day prior due to charges related to organizing primary elections in July 2020, based on the controversial National Security Law. The EU reacted and demanded their release because of violation of human rights, democratic principles, and the rule of law and autonomy of Hong Kong. Likewise, in March, the EU protested against the new Decision of the National People's Congress that strengthens the role of the Hong Kong Election Committee, a body that was not democratically elected. According to the EU, this decision will reduce the proportion of directly elected representatives in the Hong Kong Legislative Council and thus erode democracy in this part of China. In other words, both declarations point out that China continues to breach the "One Country Two Systems" principle, established with the reintegration of Hong Kong into mainland China. Serbia's nonalignment is consistent with previous moves of the Serbian leadership, such as in 2020, when Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, in his letter to Chinese President Xi Jinping, openly voiced support for Beijing's policy towards Hong Kong.<sup>5</sup>

Serbia also failed to align with the July declaration in which the EU identified the malicious cyber activities that targeted government institutions and political organizations in the EU and member states and some of the critical European industries. The EU linked these activities, whose purpose was intellectual property theft and espionage, to two hacker groups that operate from the Chinese territory - Advanced Persistent Threat 40 and Advanced Persistent Threat 31 - and urged the Chinese to take action against them.

The EU has issued two declarations concerning the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime, in which it added a total of fifteen persons and four entities to the EU sanctions list of natural and legal persons, entities, and bodies subject to restrictive measures established with the Council's Decision no. 1999 from 2020. Serbia did not align with this either. The first declaration from March 30 was connected with the arrest and imprisonment of Navalny and contained imposing restrictive measures on four persons close to Russian President Putin, while the second one was the reaction to the violation of human rights in China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Libya, Eritrea, South Sudan, and Russia, adding to the list citizens and entities from these countries.

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4) According to the US, Russian spies used network management software from the SolarWinds company to unleash a virus that spread to 18,000 government and private computer networks, gaining access to a huge amount of files from the US governmental institutions.

5) <https://mondo.rs/Info/Srbija/a1331844/Aleksandar-Vucic-si-Djinpings-pismo-Hongkong.html>

Progress was somewhat more apparent on the topic of Belarus. Serbia continued its policy from 2020 in the first months of this year, namely avoiding to align with the EU restrictive measures based on the 2012 Council's Decision no. 642, but supported political declarations. Consequently, Serbia did not align with two declarations from January and March that contained adding new persons and entities to the sanctions list and renewal of measures. However, after the forced diversion of Ryanair flight FR4978 on May 23, 2021, by the Belarus Air Force, Serbia joined both the political condemnation and the enlarged scope of sanctions, including bans of overflying over and over landing to Serbian territory for Belarus airplanes.<sup>6</sup> However, it should be noted that Serbia got two MiG 29 airplanes from Belarus (a donation).<sup>7</sup> This donation was a likely reason for Serbia's 2019 ceasing of alignment with the EU restrictive measures in the first place. In the second half of the year, Serbia aligned with one declaration that extends the existing restrictive measures introducing a ban on the overflight of EU airspace and access to EU airports by all kinds of Belarusian aircraft, and aligned with adding of an additional person to the EU restrictive measures regime against Belarus. Then it failed to align with the declaration that added eight persons and seven entities to the list, probably because some individuals have Russian citizenship. Also, Serbia failed to align with the new targeted EU economic sanctions against Belarus that extended the existing ones to three Belarussian banks. Finally, Serbia aligned with the December edition of the declaration which put 17 persons and 11 entities to the EU restrictive measures against Belarus.

Serbia then aligned with three subsequent political declarations, out of which two were connected with Lukashenko's regime using migrants and refugees from the Middle East to create a crisis on the external border of the EU and the one marking the anniversary of the controversial 2020 elections in Belarus.

It should be mentioned that, like in the period 2012-2019, it does not seem that the restrictive measures have endangered the good relations between Belarus and Serbia, as immediately after aligning with these measures, Serbian and Belarus ministers of defense met in Moscow and spoke about cooperation between the two countries.<sup>8</sup>

When it comes to declarations related to Venezuela, Serbia continued its previous policy. It aligned with the declaration against the legality of the electoral process implemented by Juan Guaidó's regime. However, it did not align with the restrictive measures (adding new persons and entities to the sanctions list), just to align with the November declaration that renewed the restrictive measures for additional 12 months.

Belgrade also seemingly continued its policy regarding declarations against Syria as well. Namely, it joined one political declaration (on the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the conflict in the country), but it failed to align with the declaration related to restrictive measures (adding one person to the list). However, as restrictive measures seem not to be connected to Russian citizens or Russia, it is unclear why Serbia did not align. In the past, the only declaration and restrictive measures related to Syria with which Serbia did not align were the ones connected to activities of Russia and Russian citizens in Syria.

Iran has been again the topic of the EU declarations, and Serbia displayed behaviour consistent with previous years. Like in the past, Serbia aligns with the EU political declarations regarding the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action regarding the Iranian nuclear program (JCPOA) – attempts of Iran to enrich uranium and Iran's decision to suspend the provisional application of the Additional Protocol, as well as additional transparency provisions under the JCPOA. But, as has been the case with the renewal of the EU's restrictive measures against this country in the past, Serbia avoided aligning with the newest renewal from April 2021.

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6) Interestingly, these positions were not announced directly by Serbia, but only became public knowledge once the EU published the list of candidate countries who aligned with the declarations and measures.

7) <https://www.novosti.rs/vesti/drustvo/997851/stigli-migovi-belorusije-aerodrom-batajnici-sleteo-teski-transport-ni-avion-velikom-posiljkom-aleksandra-lukasenka>

8) <https://www.danas.rs/drustvo/stefanovic-razgovarao-u-moskvi-sa-ministrom-odbrane-belorusije-o-saradnji/>

A somewhat strange case are the two declarations on renewal of restrictive measures on DR Congo (based on Council's Decision no. 788 from 2010), issued in a period of fewer than ten days, where Serbia failed to align with the first but did so with the second. The alignment with the EU declarations vis-à-vis Congo was uneven in the past few years, and there are no apparent reasons for it, even though there could be a possible influence of Russia and that Serbia participates with a contingent of its military forces in the UN mission in this country, MONUSCO.

Serbia again failed to align with the declaration on Burundi, extending the existing restrictive measures on this country. This is consistent with Serbia's approach since 2018, when it stopped aligning with the EU sanctions regime imposed after the 2015 putsch. As was concluded in previous reports, the reason is not apparent, but there could be some connections with Russia.

The most significant improvement from the previous year came regarding Myanmar/Burma. Serbia aligned with all eight declarations against this country, both political ones (related to the military coup and subsequent events including international facilitation efforts – in total five) and ones related to restrictive measures (three declarations). It seems that in this case, Serbia chose to abandon the interests of its partners (assuming that Belgrade did not align in the past because of Russian and China interests) or its own to demonstrate to the EU that there is some will for the improvement.

As for other improvements, it should be said that Serbia aligned with three declarations related to Nicaragua and one against Zimbabwe, which were problematic topics in the past.

## Alignment with EU foreign policy declarations by other countries

In 2021, Serbia's alignment was not the worst out of the candidates and potential candidates from the Western Balkans, as for the first time, Bosnia and Herzegovina had a lower score, at 35 percent, while Serbia had almost two times as high percentage at 61 percent. The probable reason for this low score of Bosnia's alignment is the internal situation in this country, the worst since the war, which is spilling over to its foreign policy.

All other three candidate states have an alignment rate of over 90 percent, with Albania and Montenegro scoring 100 percent of alignment. As usual, Turkey's alignment is much worse, stuck at 14 percent, but Turkey is a specific case as its accession process is treated differently. The alignment rate of non-EU countries members of the European Economic Area is also significantly higher than Serbia's - over 80%. Countries that are members of the EU's Eastern Partnership initiative and respond to the EU's invitations to align have mixed results compared to Serbia. While Moldova and Georgia are above 50 percent, Armenia's percentage was just 8 percent, while Ukraine achieved the best results with 76 percent.

State	Alignment Percentage	
Serbia	61	<b>EU Candidate and Potential Candidate States</b>
North Macedonia	93	
Montenegro	100	
Albania	100	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	35	
Turkey	14	
Lichtenstein	86	<b>European Economic Area countries outside of the EU</b>
Iceland	92	
Norway	85	
Moldova	59	<b>EU Eastern Partnership member states that join the EU declarations</b>
Armenia	8	
Georgia	52	
Ukraine	76	

ANNEX

**LIST OF THE EU'S FOREIGN POLICY  
DECLARATIONS IN 2021**



Declaration's name	No.	Date	Serbia	North Maced.	Monten.	Iceland	Albania	BiH	Lichten.	Norway	Moldova	Armenia	Georgia	Ukraine	Azerb.	Turkey
Venezuela: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union	1	06.01.2021.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Hong Kong: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the mass arrest of people involved in the July 2020 pro-democracy primary elections	2	07.01.2021.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Iran: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), following latest Iranian activities	3	11.01.2021.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes
Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain countries concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo	4	13.01.2021.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Russia: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the arrest of Alexei Navalny upon his return	5	18.01.2021.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Uganda: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the elections	6	20.01.2021.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain countries concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo	7	22.01.2021.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No

Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain countries concerning restrictive measures against Belarus	8	26.01.2021.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain countries concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Burundi	9	28.01.2021.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Myanmar: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union	10	02.02.2021.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Russia: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the sentencing of Alexei Navalny	11	03.02.2021.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
New START extension: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union	12	03.02.2021.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Libya: Declaration by the High Representative Josep Borrell on behalf of the EU on the formation of the transitional unified executive authority	13	07.02.2021.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain third countries concerning restrictive measures against Syria	14	16.02.2021.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Zimbabwe: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union	15	19.02.2021.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No



Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain third countries concerning restrictive measures against Belarus	24	24.03.2021.	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain countries concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses	25	30.03.2021.	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain countries concerning specific measures to combat terrorism	26	12.04.2021.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain countries concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine	27	12.04.2021.	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain countries concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine	28	12.04.2021.	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union expressing solidarity with the United States on the impact of the SolarWinds cyber operation	29	15.04.2021.	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes

Russia: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the deteriorating health of Alexei Navalny	30	18.04.2021.	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain countries concerning restrictive measures against Myanmar/Burma	31	19.04.2021.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain third countries concerning restrictive measures against Myanmar/Burma	32	19.04.2021.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
Russia: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union in solidarity with the Czech Republic over criminal activities on its territory	33	21.04.2021.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain countries concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses	34	27.04.2021.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Myanmar/Burma: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the outcome of the ASEAN Leaders' Meeting	35	30.04.2021.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Russia: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the imposition of restrictive measures against eight EU nationals	36	01.05.2021.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No



Nicaragua: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the deteriorating political situation	44	10.06.2021.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain countries concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus	45	21.06.2021.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with the Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1001 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus	46	06.07.2021.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with the Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1002 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus	47	06.07.2021.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with the Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1031 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus	48	13.07.2021.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
Day of International Criminal Justice: Declaration by the High Representative Josep Borrell on behalf of the European Union	49	16.07.2021.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No





Belarus: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the instrumentalisation of migrants and refugees by the regime	57	30.07.2021.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain countries with Council Decision updating the list of persons, groups and entities on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism	58	06.08.2021.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
Belarus: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the first anniversary of the 9 August 2020 fraudulent presidential elections in Belarus	59	08.08.2021.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
International Day of the World's Indigenous Peoples: Declaration by High Representative Josep Borrell, on behalf of the European Union, 9 August 2021	60	08.08.2021.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Afghanistan: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union	61	17.08.2021.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain third countries concerning restrictive measures regarding Iran	62	20.08.2021.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain third countries concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Lebanon	63	20.08.2021.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No

Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain countries concerning restrictive measures regarding Nicaragua	64	30.08.2021.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain countries concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies threatening the peace, security or stability of the Republic of Guinea- Bissau	65	08.09.2021.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
Russia: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the State Duma, regional and local elections	66	21.09.2021.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on respect for the EU's democratic processes	67	24.09.2021.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
Ethiopia: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the decision to expel seven United Nations officials	68	04.10.2021.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain countries concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine	69	05.10.2021.	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No

European and World Day against the Death Penalty, 10 October 2021: Joint statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union and the Secretary-General on behalf of the Council of Europe	70	08.10.2021.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Myanmar/Burma: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union to support the work of the ASEAN Special Envoy	71	13.10.2021.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on Sudan	72	26.10.2021.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No
Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the situation in Ethiopia	73	04.11.2021.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Myanmar/Burma: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union	74	08.11.2021.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Nicaragua: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union	75	08.11.2021.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain countries concerning restrictive measures against ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaeda and persons, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them	76	08.11.2021.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain countries concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Nicaragua	77	10.11.2021.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No

Belarus: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the situation at the European Union border	78	10.11.2021.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain countries concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine	79	18.11.2021.	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
Statement by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on behalf of the EU on the Russian anti-satellite test on 15 November 2021	80	19.11.2021.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain countries concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Venezuela	81	26.11.2021.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No
Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain countries concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States	82	02.12.2021.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain countries concerning restrictive measures in view of Turkey's unauthorised drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean	83	02.12.2021.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No

Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain countries concerning restrictive measures against the Republic of Guinea	84	02.12.2021.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
Myanmar/Burma: Declaration by the High Representative Josep Borrell on behalf of the European Union on the situation	85	06.12.2021.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes

date	Serbia	Maced.	Monten.	Iceland	Albania	BiH	Lichten.	Norway	Moldova	Armenia	Georgia	Ukraine	Azerb.	Turkey
Yes	52	79	85	78	85	30	73	72	50	7	44	65	0	12
No	33	6	0	7	0	55	12	13	35	78	41	20	85	73
Alignment percentage	61	93	100	92	100	35	86	85	59	8	52	76	0	14

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