



# CFSP

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## An analysis of Serbia's alignment with the European Union's foreign policy declarations and measures in 2020

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# An analysis of Serbia's alignment with the European Union's foreign policy declarations and measures in 2020

In the period from 1 January 2020 to 31 December 2020, the European Union (EU) issued a total of 104 foreign policy declarations with which partner countries were requested to align. Of that total, the Republic of Serbia aligned with 58 declarations. In 2020 Serbia's alignment rate with EU's foreign policy declarations and measures was 56%. Given the fact that its overall alignment rate for 2019 was 57%, and for the first half of 2020 also 57%, Serbia has basically remained in the same position for two years. However, the alignment percentage has cumulatively been in line with the general framework for alignment since 2014. Namely, Serbia's lowest alignment rate so far was the one in 2017 - at 47% and the highest in 2015 - 66%.

On the other hand, it is noteworthy that the alignment percentages are merely a descriptive category that indicates the general alignment trend, whereas the topics with which Serbia has failed to align are essentially more important. Foreign policy declarations and the measures contained therein may include a broad range of topics, and oftentimes not all of them are considered equally important to the EU and its member states. These topics include a range of issues, from imposing, amending or renewing restrictive measures against certain countries, to declarations concerning important international dates. Therefore, the EU and its member states are evidently monitoring more closely the alignment with issues of key importance for the Union's position worldwide and its proclaimed foreign policy objectives. It is in this context that the alignment of Serbia and other candidate countries is reviewed.

As claimed by Serbian officials on several occasions, the main reason for the lack of alignment with EU's foreign policy declarations and measures is the Kosovo issue,<sup>1</sup> as well as Serbia's specific position following the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. Since Pristina's unilateral declaration of independence in 2008, Serbia has improved its relations with many countries that do not recognise Kosovo, especially with Russia and China, which are UN Security Council members. On the other hand, as highlighted in the Bilateral Screening for Chapter 31, in the past period Serbia developed significant economic relations primarily with the Russian Federation, so any introduction of restrictive measures against Moscow would harm the Serbian economy.<sup>2</sup>

In any case, over the past years, Serbia has consistently failed to align mostly with those foreign policy declarations and measures that were directly or indirectly related to the Russian Federation or the People's Republic of China, or to their respective foreign policy interests.

Of the total of 46 declarations that Serbia has failed to align with, 11 refer to the Russian Federation and the armed conflict in Ukraine, six are focused on the crisis in Venezuela, five on the People's Republic of China and cyber space topics, respectively, three are related to Belarus, Nicaragua and Iran each, two to the armed conflict in Syria and the use of chemical weapons, and one to Myanmar/Burma, Pridnestrovie, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Turkey and Libya, each.

When it comes to declarations with respect to the armed conflict in Ukraine, i.e. to the Russian

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1) This was first mentioned in Serbia's answer to the EU Questionnaire in 2011, Answer to the European Commission's Questionnaire, the Ministry of European Integration of the Republic of Serbia, <https://www.mei.gov.rs/srl/dokumenta/eu-dokumenta/upitnik-ek>

2) CFSP and CSDP: Institutional/organisational framework and structure, Chapter 31 –Foreign, Security and Defence Policy, Serbia Bilateral Screening, Brussels, October 10, 2014, p. 6

Federation, six of them refer to renewing or amending the restrictive measures established under European Council Decisions (foreign policy format) Nos. 119, 145 and 512 of 2014, two focus on issues pertaining to the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17 above Ukraine in 2015, for which rebel forces in eastern Ukraine, as well as Russia, are suspected by the EU, and one on Russia's annexation of Crimea and Sebastopol. In 2020 the EU issued two more declarations targeting the Russian Federation, but these were unrelated to the conflict in Ukraine. The declaration issued in March 2020 condemned Moscow's decision to label as undesirable the European Foundation for Democracy (established by the EU), while the one issued in September 2020 condemned the attempted poisoning of Alexei Navalny.

Moreover, regular declarations issued every year that focus on restrictive measures against the leaders of Pridnestrovie, with which Serbia has also failed to align, are closely related to Russia.

As for China, in 2020 the EU issued the most number of declarations related to China so far - as many as five. None of these declarations imposed restrictive measures on China, but mainly reflected the EU's positions on the developments regarding Hong Kong. They also focused on introduction and application by Beijing of the National Security Law for the special administrative region of Hong Kong, which has seriously undermined Hong Kong's autonomy within China, established during its reintegration process in 1997. Not only has Serbia failed to align with these declarations, but Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic in his letter to Chinese President Xi Jinping has openly voiced support for Beijing's policy towards Hong Kong.<sup>3</sup>

Unlike the year before, in 2020 Serbia failed to align with any of the six declarations concerning the crisis in Venezuela. The EU issued four political declarations, plus one on renewing for another 12 months its restrictive measures against Venezuela, imposed in 2017 under Council Decision No. 2074. It does make sense to suspect that the main reason for Serbia's avoidance to align with these declarations is the support that the Maduro regime enjoys from both Beijing and Moscow.

Declarations on cyber space are currently very interesting. Since the massive cyber-attack on Georgia in October 2019, the number of declarations on this issue has soared. Despite its alignment with the declarations requesting partner countries to align with putting in place or extending the framework for restrictive measures (under Council Decisions No. 797 of 2019 and No. 651 of 2020), Serbia has failed to align with any of the declarations that either condemned the cyber-attack in question or published or amended the list of individuals targeted by the restrictive measures. Indeed, the very lists of individuals targeted by the sanctions explain the reasons for Serbia's failure to align, as some of the targeted individuals or entities are Russian or Chinese nationals or entities. In other words, Serbia has aligned in principle with the implementation of the restrictive measures, but has avoided alignment with political condemnation and specific implementation of the restrictive measures because they directly or indirectly refer to Russia and China.

The declarations that stirred up both the international and the domestic public the most were the ones concerning Belarus. The EU's restrictive measures against Belarus have been in place for more than 15 years over a series of what is labelled as irregular election cycles and over undermining of democracy and human rights in that country. The framework for restrictive measures against Belarus was last established in 2012 under Council Decision No. 642. Serbia used to align with these restrictive measures even before the accession negotiations with the EU were opened, but suddenly stopped aligning in 2019. It should be noted that throughout this period Serbia managed to maintain rather close relations with Minsk, regardless of the restrictive measures. There may be some specific reasons why Serbia ceased to align, such as the announcement of a Belarus donation of 4 MiG29 aircraft to Serbia, since weapons and military equipment are also targeted by the EU's restrictive measures. However, what came as a shock to the public was the fact that Serbia aligned with three declarations issued in August and September 2020, which condemned the way the presidential election was conducted in Belarus, the undermining of democracy, and human rights violations in that country. This seemed to be an unexpected move, and on top of that, Serbia cancelled its participation in the

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3) <https://mondo.rs/Info/Srbija/a1331844/Aleksandar-Vucic-si-Djinpings-pismo-Hongkong.html>

“Slavic Brotherhood” joint military exercise with Russian and Belarus troops, scheduled to be held on the territory of Belarus (soon afterwards the Serbian government cancelled all military exercises with all partners for a six month period). On the other hand, Serbia’s failure to align with the declarations issued in November 2020 that extended and amended the framework for restrictive measures targeting individuals and entities from Belarus has not attracted public attention. All in all, Serbia’s alignment with the August and September declarations appears to have been an opportunistic foreign policy move, rather than expression of a more consistent policy.

Just like in previous years, Serbia has aligned with declarations concerning the crisis in Syria, except with those focusing on the developments that were directly or indirectly linked to actions undertaken by Russia with respect to this conflict. Declarations concerning the use of chemical weapons on the Syrian frontline are particularly relevant because Serbia ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention and is a member of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Of the total of four declarations issued in 2020, with which Serbia did not align, three concern the use and proliferation of chemical weapons in cases that are directly or indirectly associated with Russia, and only one refers to a particular political event – the Conference on Refugees in Damascus.

Serbia’s failure to align in 2019 with declarations concerning the crisis in Nicaragua continued into 2020. These declarations either condemn the current situation in Nicaragua or renew restrictive measures that the EU imposed in 2019. However, in 2018 Serbia did align with one declaration concerning the same topic. Although Nicaragua has not recognised the independence of Kosovo, this is an unlikely reason for Serbia’s failure to align with the said declarations. On the other hand, the fact that Nicaragua has extremely close relations with the Russian Federation could be one possible reason.

Although Serbia mainly aligns with foreign policy declarations concerning Iran, since 2018 it has failed to align with the set of restrictive measures against that country. Belgrade is probably trying to perform a balancing act here, demonstrating its readiness to join in when it comes to condemning Iran over human rights violations and to supporting the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action regarding the Iranian nuclear programme on the one hand, while without being ready to implement strict restrictive measures against Iran, on the other. Iran is a significant power in the Middle East region and is also a country that has not recognised the independence of Kosovo.

In 2020 Serbia continued its practice of failure to align with declarations concerning the situation in Myanmar/Burma, i.e. those that refer to the crisis in the Rakhine state - the military intervention conducted by the government on Myanmar/Burma that triggered a refugee crisis. As the Myanmar/Burma regime was supported by Russia and China in UN bodies, this is probably the reason why Serbia has failed to join the EU’s restrictive measures against that country.

Serbia has also failed to align with the framework for restrictive measures against Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is regularly renewed every year. Although this framework for restrictive measures was put in place as far back as 2011, no list of targeted individuals and entities has been published to-date. Serbia has been consistent in its position on this issue, having explained in its Answer to the European Commission’s Questionnaire back in 2011 that it found problematic the declarations concerning the consequences of the break-up of the former Yugoslavia.

Declarations concerning Turkey are also interesting primarily because Turkey is an EU candidate country as well, and is regularly invited to align with the EU’s foreign policy approach. Due to what the EU and the Republic of Cyprus view as Turkey’s unauthorised exploration of natural gas resources in the waters around the internationally unrecognised state of Northern Cyprus, in December 2019 the EU established a framework for restrictive measures targeting individuals and entities from Turkey, with which Serbia did align. However, Serbia failed to align with the next declaration issued in March 2020, in which the names of two individuals targeted by the sanctions were published, but then aligned with the declaration issued in December 2020, which extended the restrictive measures and added more individuals to the list. Having in mind Serbia’s pragmatic and

close relations with the regime of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, it would not be a surprise if Serbia was perhaps calculating whether it should join these declarations or not. But it seems that joining these declarations would not be an issue anyway, as far as the relations between Belgrade and Ankara are concerned.

Finally, the last declaration that Serbia has failed to join is the one amending the list of individuals targeted by the restrictive measures against Libya, which were established under Council Decision No. 1333 of 2013. Serbia did align with the initial declaration and continued to regularly join all subsequent renewals and amendments thereof. In 2020 the EU issued a total of nine declarations, four of which were political in nature, while five focused on renewing the restrictive measures, i.e. amending the list of targeted individuals and entities. Serbia has failed to align only with the latest declaration issued in early December, which concerned the amendment to the list of individuals targeted by the restrictive measures. The amended list contains the names of two Russian nationals, businessmen associated with the operation of Russia's "Wagner" paramilitary group.

## Alignment with EU foreign policy declarations by other countries

In 2020 Serbia's alignment rate with EU's foreign policy declarations was still the lowest as compared to other EU candidate countries in the Western Balkans. Just like in the previous years, in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina it is the only country in the region whose alignment rate is below 90%. Of all the candidate countries, Turkey is the only one whose alignment rate is lower than Serbia's, but Turkey is definitely a specific case as its accession process is treated differently. The alignment rate of non-EU countries that are members of the European Economic Area is also significantly higher than Serbia's - over 70%. Likewise, almost all countries that are members of the EU's Eastern Partnership initiative and that respond to EU's invitations to align have higher alignment rates than Serbia. The only exception is Armenia, with an alignment rate of 27%.

State	Alignment Percentage	
Serbia	56	<b>EU Candidate States</b>
North Macedonia	93	
Montenegro	100	
Albania	100	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	68	
Turkey	12	
Lichtenstein	78	<b>European Economic Area countries outside of the EU</b>
Iceland	89	
Norway	74	
Moldova	66	<b>EU Eastern Partnership member states that join the EU declarations</b>
Armenia	27	
Georgia	60	
Ukraine	74	

ANNEX

**LIST OF THE EU'S FOREIGN POLICY  
DECLARATIONS IN 2020**

## Alignment with the EU's foreign policy declarations

No	Name of declaration	Date	Ser.	N.Mac.	Mont.	Icel.	Alb.	B&H	Lich.	Nor.	Mold.	Arm.	Geor.	Ukra.	Tur.
1	Venezuela: Declaration by the High Representative Josep Borrell on behalf of the EU on the latest developments on the National Assembly	09.01.2020.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
2	Declaration by the High Representative Josep Borrell on behalf of the EU on South Sudan	21.01.2020.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
3	Honduras: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the non-renewal of the Mission to Support the Fight Against Corruption and Impunity	22.01.2020.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
4	Declaration by the High Representative Josep Borrell on behalf of the EU on the Middle East Peace Process	28.01.2020.	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
5	Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain third countries concerning restrictive measures in view of Turkey's unauthorised drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean	31.01.2020.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
6	Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain third countries concerning restrictive measures against ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaeda and persons, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them	31.01.2020.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
7	Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain third countries concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo	31.01.2020.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
8	Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union - call to promote and conduct responsible behaviour in cyberspace	21.02.2020.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
9	Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain countries concerning the list of persons, groups and entities subject to the application of specific measures to combat terrorism	25.02.2020.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
10	Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the political situation in Guinea	28.02.2020.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes



11	Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on current political developments in Afghanistan and the prospects for peace	29.02.2020.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
12	Declaration of the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the start of the criminal trial on the downing of flight MH17	07.03.2020.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
13	Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain third countries concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine	11.03.2020.	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
14	Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the political situation in Guinea-Bissau	12.03.2020.	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
15	Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the latest developments in Somalia	14.03.2020.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
16	Declaration by the High Representative Josep Borrell Fontelles, on behalf of the European Union, on the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol	16.03.2020.	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
17	Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain third countries concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in Tunisia	24.03.2020.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
18	Russia: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on listing the European Endowment for Democracy as an “undesirable organisation”	27.03.2020.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
19	Declaration by the High Representative Joseph Borrell, on behalf of the European Union, on the situation in Libya	27.03.2020.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
20	Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain countries concerning restrictive measures against Belarus	31.03.2020.	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
21	Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain countries concerning restrictive measures in view of Turkey’s unauthorised drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean	31.03.2020.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No





44	Declaration by the High Representative, on behalf of the European Union, on the latest developments in Venezuela	04.06.2020.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
45	South Sudan: declaration by the High Representative, on behalf of the European Union, on delays in the implementation of the peace agreement and widespread violence	11.06.2020.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
46	Venezuela: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the latest developments	16.06.2020.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
47	Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain third countries concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its member states	19.06.2020.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
48	Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain countries concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Nicaragua	23.06.2020.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
49	Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain third countries concerning restrictive measures against Syria	25.06.2020.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
50	Declaration of the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the adoption by China's National People's Congress of a National Security Legislation on Hong Kong	01.07.2020.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
51	Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the occasion of the 6th anniversary of the downing	16.07.2020.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
52	Day of International Criminal Justice: Declaration by the High Representative Josep Borrell on behalf of the European Union	16.07.2020.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
53	Declaration by the High Representative Josep Borrell on behalf of the EU: European Union response to promote international security and stability in cyberspace	30.7.2020.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
54	Declaration of the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the postponement of the Legislative Council elections in Hong Kong	3.8.2020.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
55	Belarus: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the presidential elections	11.08.2020.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No





80	Tanzania – Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the elections in Tanzania	02.11.2020.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
81	Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain third countries concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Libya	04.11.2020.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
82	Syria: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the refugee conference in Damascus	10.11.2020.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
83	Hong Kong: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the disqualification of Members of the Hong Kong Legislative Council	12.11.2020.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
84	Nagorno-Karabakh: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union	19.11.2020.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
85	Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain third countries concerning restrictive measures against Belarus	20.11.2020.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
86	Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain third countries concerning restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova	20.11.2020.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
87	Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain third countries concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine	20.11.2020.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
88	Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain third countries concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine	20.11.2020.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
89	Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain third countries concerning restrictive measures against the proliferation and use of chemical weapons	23.11.2020.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
90	Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain third countries concerning restrictive measures against the proliferation and use of chemical weapons	23.11.2020.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No





102	Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain countries concerning restrictive measures in view of Turkey's unauthorised drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean	14.12.2020.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
103	Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain countries concerning restrictive measures against Syria	14.12.2020.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
104	Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain countries concerning serious human rights violations and abuses	22.12.2020.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
No		<b>Date</b>	<b>Ser.</b>	<b>N. Mac.</b>	<b>Mont.</b>	<b>Icel.</b>	<b>Alb.</b>	<b>B&amp;H</b>	<b>Lich.</b>	<b>Nor.</b>	<b>Mold.</b>	<b>Arm.</b>	<b>Geor.</b>	<b>Ukra.</b>	<b>Tur.</b>		
			58	97	104	93	104	71	81	77	69	28	62	77	12		
	Aligned with		46	7	0	11	0	33	23	27	35	76	42	27	92		
	Not aligned with																
	<b>Alignment Percentage</b>		<b>56</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>12</b>		



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