



CFSP

and Serbian Accession
to the European Union

An analysis of Serbia's compliance with EU foreign policy declarations and measures in 2016

Authors:

Jovana Perkućin

Igor Novaković

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*INTERNATIONAL AND SECURITY AFFAIRS CENTRE

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Introduction

The foreign policy activity of the European Union is embedded in its founding values and common interests of its member states, which, as the Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy of the EU puts it, “go hand in hand.”¹ The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) rests on a consensus reached after an extensive harmonization of positions and coordination, making the EU foreign policy decisions the smallest common denominator of member states’ foreign policies, i.e. the core of common interests. Because of that, the Union and its member states find it difficult to accept when partner states, or those striving to achieve EU membership, do not heed the reasons which led to making certain decisions, i.e. avoid to align with them.

Since the publication of the Thessaloniki Agenda in 2003, where Serbia’s and other Western Balkan countries’ EU membership perspective was explicitly recognized, the EU has been calling on Serbia to align with the CFSP. After this perspective was formalized through the Association and Stabilization Agreement that went into effect in 2013, and after Serbia was granted the EU membership candidate status leading to the opening of negotiations, Serbia took upon itself to gradually harmonize its positions with the EU foreign policy activities by carrying out economic, political and institutional reforms. In itself, the process of EU accession negotiations actually means the adoption of legal and political traditions of the Union defined in 35 chapters, where Chapter 31 pertains to harmonization of Serbia’s foreign, security and defense policy with the EU approach. Although this chapter does not contain the EU *acquis communautaire* and therefore does not demand a comprehensive adjustment of the legal framework, in view of the above-mentioned reasons it still carries a major political and value-related significance.

When passing its foreign policy declarations, the European Union in most cases urges the countries that are members of the European Economic Area, candidates and potential candidates for EU membership, as well as the countries of the Eastern Partnership to harmonize with them, which implies the implementation of measures stemming from such declarations. In this way these countries’ dedication to values on which the EU is founded is being expressed and the convergence of interests proved. In other words, the extent to which these declarations are honored reflects the scope and quality of a certain country’s harmonization with the EU foreign policy and indicates this country’s reliability as a foreign policy partner of the EU.

It should be noted, however, that although harmonization with the EU foreign policy declarations and measures is the most prominent and most significant element of Chapter 31, there still is a whole range of other elements in this chapter where Serbia can make progress and thereby show to its partners that it indeed intends to become an EU member, which is what its Negotiation Team has been largely doing. Although the explanatory and bilateral screenings ended in mid-October 2014 and the Screening Report was submitted for further procedure in January 2016, it is currently not being deliberated on in any of the committees. It is important to stress, however, that the Negotiating Team and the Working Group for Chapter 31 have initiated the process of fulfilling the elements pertaining to Chapter 31 which are not exclusively tied to the harmonization with foreign policy declarations and measures. Serbia is already participating in military missions and EU Common Security and Defense Policy operations, being in this the leading contributor from the Western Balkans, and has initiated the process of creating a system for dispatching civilians to peace missions, which has been recognized as an absent element during the screening process. The goal is to establish a quality system as soon as possible, as

¹ - *Зajедничка визија, удружено деловање: јача Европа. Глобална стратегија за спољну и безбедносну политику Европске уније* (a translation of the original document), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, the Institute for European Studies, the International and Security Affairs Centre - ISAC Fund, Belgrade, 2016, p. 19. As stressed further on in the text, the interest of the EU is “to promote its values in the world (...) At the same time, the EU fundamental values are embedded in the EU’s interests.”

well as to offer a concrete contribution to EU civilian missions by dispatching Serbian experts to them. Furthermore, in addition to Romania, Bulgaria, Cyprus and Ukraine, Serbia has also joined the EU Greece-led Helbrook combat group. Also, after the publication of the EU Global Strategy for Common Security and Defense Policy, Serbia began preparing a new National Security Strategy and a National Defense Strategy. The process of their compilation, public debate and making of their final versions is expected to be over by the end of 2017. Finally, in 2016 Serbia adopted a Law on International Restrictive Measures, thereby creating a legal and technical basis for introducing restrictive measures against third countries, whereas the implementation of specific measures will depend on political decisions.

Still, before becoming a Union member, a candidate country has to have achieved full alignment of its foreign policy with the EU foreign policy approach and to have offered proof of its progressive harmonization with the CFSP.

Serbia's Alignment with CFSP prior to 2016

In contrast to the 2008-2011 period when Serbia had been harmonizing its foreign policy with the CFSP in a very limited way, from 2012 to 2014 a conspicuous upward trend existed.² A more stable international situation in that period led to the EU adopting a significantly lower number of foreign policy declarations and measures. Also, the EU's foreign policy activities were not focused on the countries the Serbian political elite perceived as important partners. Since the beginning of 2014, however, Serbia faces a more difficult position because of the eruption of the Ukraine crisis, after the EU took a firmer course toward Moscow and introduced sanctions against Russia because of its annexation of Crimea and the escalation of clashes in eastern Ukraine. It should be noted that because of its closeness to Moscow, functionally established in 2007 and shortly before the unilateral declaration of Kosovo's independence, and which continues throughout Serbia's efforts to prevent further recognition of Kosovo's independence to this day, not even prior to 2014 had Serbia aligned with the declarations that directly or indirectly pertained to Russia.³

Since the opening of the negotiations in 2014, Serbia has been justifying its non-alignment with the declarations pertaining to Russia by saying that "as opposed to EU member countries," it has "no means to compensate for the ensuing damage," primarily due to its energy dependence on Russia and the level of economic cooperation between the two countries. In 2015 and 2016, Serbian officials also raised the issue of Kosovo, i.e. Russia's assistance in preventing further recognitions of Kosovo's independence and its joining international institutions and initiatives. They kept stressing that their European partners had been timely informed of Serbia's position, which remains principled and unchanging. Serbia's most senior officials reiterated explicitly a number of times that they would not introduce sanctions against Russia. Furthermore, ever since giving answers to the European Commission's Questionnaire Serbian officials have remained firm in their stance that they would not align with the declarations impacting the specific position the country had found itself in in the wake of the SFRY's dissolution, primarily those pertaining to Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the past years Serbia also failed to harmonize with the declarations concerning China, Azerbaijan, certain members of the Non-Aligned movement (primarily from Africa), the countries that did not recognize Kosovo's independence, and some of the former Yugoslav republics.

2 - According to the European Commission Report for 2012 harmonization was 99 percent.

3 - See Igor Novaković, *Od četiri stuba spoljne politike do evropskih integracija: Postoji li volja za strateško usmerenje spoljne politike Srbije?*, ISAC fond, Beograd, 2013,

Such practice continued in 2015, when in addition to the declarations indirectly or directly targeting Russia (Ukraine, Pridnestrovie, and similar), Serbia did not harmonize with the decision on restrictive measures aiming at Bosnia and Herzegovina and Zimbabwe, nor with the declaration jointly published by the EU and the Council of Europe on the occasion of Day Against the Death Penalty.

Gradual or progressive alignment? Report on the Chapter 31 screening

On many occasions the EU said that Serbia is expected to progressively harmonize its foreign policy with the EU (until 2014, the term “gradual harmonization” was used in communication with candidate countries, but after the eruption of the Ukraine crisis, the term was changed). Still, a question is raised as to what is actually meant under the term “progressive harmonization”? Does it imply an increasing percentage of harmonization from one year of negotiations to another, or something else? Although the Serbian officials mentioned many times the alignment of the country’s foreign policy with the EU stressing a very high percentage of compliance in the 2011-2013 period, EU representatives kept underlining that the percentages are indeed high, but are not crucial. Serbia is expected to at a certain point achieve full harmonization with the EU foreign policy, i.e. align with all EU declarations. Until that time, Serbia is expected to send as clear signal as possible to indicate its intention that it will do so in the future. As we have already mentioned, however, Serbia has other ways of demonstrating its dedication to harmonizing with the EU foreign policy and contribute to its own better positioning by actively working on other elements in Chapter 31. In this way Serbia would send a clear message of being ready for a full-fledged EU membership and show that its foreign policy rests on the same values and interests as the EU foreign policy.

It is a fact that the EU, or at least some of the member states, has much reservation when Serbia’s foreign policy is in question. These countries see its non-alignment as a potential problem in the context of Serbia’s devotion to European values, but also as a lack of solidarity with the member states. The reason for that probably lies in their feeling threatened by Moscow’s actions in Ukraine and their immediate neighborhood, but also because of the media and cyber offensive against the member states, which the EU blames on Russia. This is probably one of the reasons why Serbia has not yet received the Report on the Chapter 31 Screening, although the bilateral and explanatory screenings were completed back in October 2014. Having in view the fact that for the publication of the Report a consensus of all member states is needed, it is very probable that Serbia will not get the Report before the beginning of 2018.

In addition to this, there is also another unknown in the public discourse involving the introduction of transitional and closing criteria for measuring progress in Chapter 31-related negotiations, which had not existed for other candidate countries. On the one hand, the introduction of criteria could be good for the negotiating process, because in that case Serbia would clearly know what is expected from it and what conditions it should meet in order to close that chapter. This would also somewhat reduce the political significance of that chapter and there would exist clear parameters based on which Serbia’s progress in this area could be monitored. On the other hand, the introduction of criteria could turn out to be a bad move, primarily because it may be interpreted as the posing of new conditions, whereby the chapter’s closure would be made politically more difficult.

An analysis of alignment in 2016⁴

Of the 33 foreign policy declarations the EU published in 2016, Serbia failed to comply with one-third, i.e. 11. In percentages, Serbia's alignment with the EU declarations and measures that year was 66.66 percent. In terms of percentages only, there was a decline in the country's harmonization compared to 2015, when its compliance level was 73.53 percent, although it was still higher than in 2014, when the percentage of compliance amounted to only 51.4 percent.

Of the 11 declarations Serbia failed to comply with, nine directly or indirectly related to Russia. Of those, six pertained to the extension or revision of restrictive measures against individuals or entities from Russia believed to be involved in disrupting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and the restrictive measures introduced in response to, as was stressed, "the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol." In connection with the Ukraine crisis was also a declaration published on the occasion of the second anniversary of the downing of the Malaysian passenger plane MH17, in which the EU underlined full support to the investigation and warned that those responsible must bear the consequences of this crime. Finally, for the first time there were two declarations pertaining (the first one indirectly, and the second one directly) to Russia's actions during the conflict in Syria, where it directly and militarily supports the forces of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. In these declarations the EU condemns the escalation of violence in the city of Aleppo, the excessive use of force and the direct threats to the lives of a very large number of civilians, in addition to the continuous violations of human rights and the norms of international humanitarian law, but also underlines its support to Syria's territorial integrity and calls for a cessation of hostilities. Precisely at the time when the criticism of Russia's engagement and of the actions in Aleppo reached their peak, Serbia, through Russia, sent humanitarian aid to Syria, which was seen in the negative light by the EU.

The other two declarations Serbia failed to comply with related to China and the Republic of the Congo. In the previous year China was not either directly or indirectly the subject of the EU foreign policy declarations. Serbia continued with the practice of non-compliance although the introduction of restrictive measures was not at issue, but rather taking of a stand regarding an international dispute in the South China Sea. In this declaration, the EU reacts to the dispute in a principled manner, in accordance with its declared values and strategic priorities, urging all sides to resolve the issue peacefully and in line with the international law (the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea). In the declaration the Union expresses its support to the ASEAN-led regional processes, as well as to a swift conclusion of the talks on the "Code of Conduct" which will further support a rules-based regional and international order. The EU also offered to share its experience and its own best practices on maritime security.

The only declaration involving African countries Serbia failed to comply with was dedicated to the situation in the Republic of the Congo after the presidential vote in that country, in which the EU expressed its deep concern over events there and stressed that the legality of the vote is being questioned due to the human rights violations, arrests and intimidation of the opposition. The Union urged all sides to show restraint and refrain from all acts of violence and manipulation.

The list of declarations Serbia did not align with clearly shows that Serbia's relations with Russia are the major obstacle to the country's full harmonization with the EU foreign policy. In other words, the refusal to progressively adopt the Union's approach to the Ukraine crisis, Syria and other neuralgic spots where Russia is engaged, is the main stumbling block. As far as China is

4 - The analyzed declarations were downloaded from the webpage of the European Council and the Council of the European Union www.consilium.europa.eu. In other words, all declarations made publicly available (through press releases) containing a reference to harmonization, along with the dates of their posting, were analyzed.

concerned, Serbia is not complying with the declarations related to this country because China is one of two UN Security Council permanent members that did not recognize Kosovo's independence. Serbia's ever improving partner relations with China, economic, but also political, should be also taken into account. For instance, Chinese Hesteel has taken over the Smederevo steel mill, and in 2016 Serbia abolished visa requirements for Chinese citizens and is for now the only European country having no travel restrictions for them whatsoever.

When it comes to the African countries, there was a total of seven declarations involving different countries – Tunisia, Libya, the Republic of the Congo, Egypt, South Sudan, Burundi and Guinea. Of these, Serbia supported six declarations, and the only exception was the one pertaining to the Congo. Two-thirds of declarations concerned the alignment with the restrictive measures introduced against the individuals and entities connected to the situations in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Burundi and the Republic of Guinea (there was one declaration for each country). The remaining two declarations dealt with the political situation in the Republic of the Congo in the wake of a presidential vote and the ongoing situation in South Sudan. As opposed to first five declarations, the latter did not call for the adoption of restrictive measures, but were an analysis of the political situation in these two countries, expressing concern over the degree of violations of human rights and urging that the situation be remedied as soon as possible.

The declaration on the situation in the Republic of the Congo concerned the legality of the presidential election being questioned because of the widespread violation of human rights, arrests and intimidation of the opposition. There are several possible explanations as to why Serbia failed to comply with this declaration. The most logical one is that in this case Serbia's foreign policy interest involving Kosovo had prevailed. Namely, the Republic of the Congo did not recognize Kosovo's independence and it voted against Kosovo's admission to UNESCO. It is possible that because of this, and its future "struggle" to prevent Pristina from gaining membership in this and other international organizations, Serbia avoided alignment with this document. Having in view that Pristina will have the right to again apply for membership in UNESCO in 2017, and that in the previous vote only three votes against prevented it from succeeding, it is possible that Serbia decided to "award" those foreign partners which helped its efforts. This assumption, however, is not fully supported. Namely, South Sudan also did not recognize Kosovo and voted against its admission to UNESCO. In the latter case, however, Serbia voted in favor of the declaration on that country. The explanation for this different approach probably lies in the political situation in Serbia at the time. Namely, when the Congo declaration was debated, Serbia had a technical government which was working with a minimum capacity, while at the time the South Sudan declaration was on the agenda, the new government had been well in office, meaning that there were no obstacles to a timely debate and taking a stance on the foreign policy issues of the sort. Because of the failure to comply during the term of the technical government in 2014, the new government introduced a retroactive alignment with the EU declarations and measures not problematic from Serbia's standpoint. ISAC has no information whether the Serbian government has retroactively accepted the declaration on the Republic of the Congo as well.

As far as other foreign policy declarations are concerned, Serbia complied with the introduction, addition to and extension of EU restrictive measures against Belarus (two declarations), Syria (three declarations), and the Democratic Republic of Korea (one declaration). EU sanctions were not directly targeting the states as such, i.e. all their citizens, but the individuals and entities the EU considers directly connected to the subject that had prompted the issuing of the declaration (mainly they are aimed at the regimes of the countries involved the EU holds responsible for the situations the declarations deal with). The declarations involving restrictive measures were related to the Democratic Republic of Korea and the Republic of Guinea.

Serbia has aligned with most declarations in which the EU urged third countries to make certain moves, such as:

- One declaration dedicated to the political situation in Lebanon, urging all stakeholders to elect a president as soon as possible;
- One declaration endorsing a report by the Middle East Quartet containing recommendations for creating conditions for a two-state system in the case of Palestine and Israel;
- One declaration on the occasion of the first anniversary of the nuclear deal with Iran commending the dedication of all sides to its implementation;
- The already mentioned one declaration condemning the crimes committed in South Sudan during July 2016 and urging the government to prosecute those responsible;
- One declaration whereby the EU and Member States express their concern over the developments in Turkey in the wake of the attempted coup of July 15, and especially concerning the plans for reinstating the death penalty, continued restrictions on the freedom of expression, weakening of the rule of law, and compromising parliamentary democracy.

This time around, Serbia complied with all declarations the EU issued on the occasion of international days of significance for the values the EU stands for: the Declaration on the occasion of the World Press Freedom Day (May 3), the Declaration on the occasion of the International Day Against Homophobia, Transphobia and Biophobia (May 17), the Declaration on the occasion of the International Criminal Justice Day (July 16), the Declaration on the occasion of the European and World Day Against the Death Penalty (October 10) and the Declaration on the occasion of the International Human Rights Day (December 10).

Other countries and alignment with CFSP

By comparison and in percentages, of all Western Balkan countries Serbia has the lowest rate of compliance with the EU foreign policy. Of the candidate states, only Turkey's rate is lower than Serbia's, which is only logical in view of the ups and downs the relations between the EU and Ankara have been going through. Also, the countries of the European Economic Space – Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein – have a higher alignment rate with CFSP than Serbia. Of the Eastern Partnership members, only Ukraine has a higher compliance rate, Moldova has the same rate as Serbia, while the rates of Armenia, and Georgia are significantly lower. Azerbaijan in 2016 did not to align at all with the EU foreign and security policy.

Country	Compliance percentage rate in 2016
Serbia	66.66%
Macedonia	72.73%
Montenegro	100%
Iceland	72.73%
Albania	93.94%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	69.70%
Turkey	12.12%
Liechtenstein	93.94%
Norway	93.94%
Moldova	66.66%
Armenia	24.24%
Georgia	42.42%
Ukraine	72.73%
Azerbaijan	0%

Although Serbia could justify its non-compliance by pointing to a similar approach of other countries, such as Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, both candidate countries, too, it is important to note that only Serbia is included in an active EU accession process, not to mention that these two countries had a higher compliance rate in 2016. Turkey, on the other hand, as a regional power, has a different relation with the EU from other candidate countries, in view of the crisis in the Middle East, the migrant crisis, and a specific approach toward Russia (to say the least), as well as in view of its ongoing internal processes (the 2016 coup attempt, reinstatement of the death penalty, etc).

Conclusion

Since the breakout of the Ukraine crisis Serbia is facing a similar situation as in the 2008-2011 period, the only difference being that it is now a candidate country. It is obvious that Serbia is trying, as is frequently reported in the media, to “balance” between the EU and Russia, which is a politically untenable position in the long run, of course if Serbia is truly striving to obtain a full-fledged EU membership.

At the moment, two absolutely strategic foreign policy priorities are circulating in the public: joining the EU and fighting against further recognition of Kosovo’s statehood. The only meeting point of these two goals is reflected in the Brussels Agreement (actually a series of agreements between Belgrade and Pristina made under the EU mediation, of which certainly the most important is the First Agreement on the principles for normalizing relations), whereas otherwise the two goals are far from being complementary, at least judging by the moves of the EU and the official Belgrade. The above analysis shows that preventing further recognitions of Kosovo’s independence and Pristina’s membership in international organizations is the basic reason for Serbia’s non-compliance with CFSP, although it is possible that since 2007 and 2008 other reasons and needs may have emerged for Belgrade’s abiding by this course.

Also, since the political and technical negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina are still in progress, it is possible that Belgrade is trying to have as many trump cards as possible and to meet the normalization of relations, demanded by the key EU members, in as good position as possible, ensuring also a better status for Kosovo Serbs. Distancing between Moscow and Brussels as of 2014 and the Ukrainian crisis, however, has radically changed the approach of most EU member countries, which are not looking keenly on Serbia’s relations with a country they perceive as jeopardizing Europe’s security order and even security within their own borders. On the other hand, it is beyond doubt that Russia is trying to “push the West away from its borders” and, in that sense, the EU’s stabilization cannot be in its interest. As of recently, thus, no support is being heard to Serbia’s EU membership such as was frequent prior to 2014 (especially concerning Serbia’s NATO membership, when Moscow used to stress it has nothing against EU membership for Serbia, as opposed to membership in the North Atlantic Alliance), while the pro-Russian media operating in Serbia are increasingly reporting on EU weaknesses. Having all this in view, it is a big question whether support to Serbia’s EU membership is in the interest of Russia.

Although principles are being insisted upon, Serbia has failed to offer a consistent and principled support to Ukraine, requiring nothing more than a strong verbal reaction, especially in the situations when most senior Russian officials make clear parallels between unilaterally declared independence of Kosovo and the status of Crimea.⁵ A principled approach would be for Serbia to consistently and equally treat all countries with which relations are shaped based on whether

5 - “Putin: Crimea Like Kosovo,” N1 TV’s internet page, November 17, 2014 (accessed March 1, 2017), <http://rs.n1info.com/a12453/Svet/Svet/Putin-Krim-kao-Kosovo.html>

they have recognized Kosovo as an independent state or not. Or, to go back to the example of sending humanitarian aid to Aleppo. If it indeed wished to help Syrian citizens, which in every case is commendable, politically the safest and certainly the most principled way would be to tie this action to a multilateral approach, i.e. to proceed through the UN and its agencies, or the International Committee of the Red Cross. Everything else, in a situation where in the West and Russia have a radically opposed approaches as to who they support in Syria and while the EU criticizes Russia for contributing to the humanitarian crisis in that country, places Serbia in an unfavorable position. Serbia is in a similar position when it comes to the issues concerning security challenges in Europe, too.

Of course, reasons of realpolitik count for all countries, but realpolitik frequently places weak or weaker actors, such as Serbia, in a divided loyalty position. In this sense, Serbia will have to continue to balance between these two extremes as long as it does not muster the strength to side with one of them, or as long as these do not reach a compromise, or as long as Serbia itself does not find a modus vivendi that both sides would accept (which is very unlikely).

Serbia should realistically determine its own interests, primarily having in view the security of its citizens, and use this as a point of departure in defining its strategic priorities and values to go "hand in hand." By founding its approach on the values and the ensuing interests, and by their consistent implementation, Serbia would not find itself in between two sides. In this sense, if EU membership remains its strategic priority, we believe that Serbia should in the midterm develop a mechanism of more efficient compliance with the EU's common foreign and security policy in order to fulfill the Union's request for progressive harmonization. Until then, Serbia should use all opportunities to better communicate its positions to its partners and more actively work on other issues related to Chapter 31, as well as other matters that have implications for foreign policy, such as was the case during the migrant crisis. In this way it would demonstrate a higher degree of solidarity with EU member states and would help itself be perceived as a serious candidate for EU membership.

On the other hand, the EU should as soon as possible send Serbia the Report on the Chapter 31 Screening, in order to make the defining of the framework within which the dialog on this chapter is being conducted finally possible.

ANNEX

**LIST OF EU FOREIGN POLICY DECLARATIONS
IN 2016.**

Compliance with EU foreign policy declarations and measures in 2016 – Third countries

No.	Declaration title	Date	Ser	Mac	Mont	Isl	Alb	BIH	Liec	Nor	Mol	Jer	Geor	Ukr	Azer	Tur.
1	Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain countries concerning restrictive measures against Belarus	04.02.2016.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
2	Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain countries concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine	04.02.2016.	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
3	Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain countries concerning restrictive measures against Syria	04.02.2016.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
4	Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain countries concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in Tunisia	23.02.2016.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
5	Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on Recent Developments in the South China Sea	13.3.2016.	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
6	Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU concerning the political situation in the Republic of the Congo following the presidential election	07.04. 2016.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
7	Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain countries concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine	15.04.2016.	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
8	Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain countries concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine	15.04.2016.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No

29.	Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain third countries concerning restrictive measures against Syria	08.12.2016.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	
30.	Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain third countries concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine	08.12.2016.	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	
31.	Declaration by the High Representative Federica Mogherini on behalf of the European Union on Human Rights Day, 10 December 2016	09.12.2016.	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	
32	Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain third countries concerning restrictive measures against Syria	09.12.2016.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	
33.	Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the situation in Aleppo	09.12.2016.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	
No.		Date	Serb	Mac	Mont	Isl	Alb	BIH	Liec	Nor	Mol	Jer	Geor	Ukr	Azer	Tur
	Complied		22	24	33	24	31	23	31	31	22	8	14	24	0	4
	Did not comply		11	9	0	9	2	10	2	2	11	25	19	9	33	29
	Compliance percentage %		66,66	72,73	100	72,73	93,94	69,70	93,94	93,94	66,66	24,24	42,42	72,73	0	12,12

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