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Büro Belgrad

Conference Report

Ukraine Crisis. Views from Ukraine, Germany and Serbia

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Introduction

The International and Security Affairs Centre – the ISAC Fund, in cooperation with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation organised in Belgrade the international conference titled "*UKRAINE CRISIS – VIEWS FROM UKRAINE, GERMANY AND SERBIA*". The conference was organised with a view to exchanging information and presenting the thoughts of the Kiev elite on the Ukrainian crisis and its most significant aspects.

The Ukraine crisis is one of the major challenges for the European Union (EU) today, which affects not only the international relations and stability of an EU partner country in Eastern Europe, but the security of the EU as a whole. Europe's position on the Ukrainian crisis is grounded in its core values.

On the other hand, EU's relationship with Russia has deteriorated and the Union has yet to develop an entirely balanced and coherent policy towards this country. Serbia, due to its "special relations with Russia" and its EU candidate country status, has found itself in a strait between two entities with which it has a partnership relationship. Due to a heated internal debate on Serbia's foreign policy orientation and progressive alignment with EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, the citizens of Serbia need unbiased information from all sides.

The conference was attended by the following:

Panellists:

Dr Borys Bazylevsky, former Ukrainian ambassador to Ireland and leading expert, Center for Russian Studies;

Mr Knut Fleckenstein, Member of the European Parliament, Social Democratic Party of Germany;

Mr Pavlo Sheremeta, former Ukrainian Minister of Economic Development and Trade (2014) and former President of EERC/Kyiv School of Economics;

Viktor Zamiatin, leading expert, Razumkov Centre;

Dr Ivan Vujačić, former Serbian ambassador to the USA and professor at the Belgrade Faculty of Economics;

Discussants:

Mr Borko Stefanović, Chair of the Democratic Party Parliamentary Group and former Political Director at the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

Ms Aleksandra Joksimović, President of the Center for Foreign Policy and former Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of FR Yugoslavia;

Mr Mijat Lakićević, Deputy Editor in Chief of "Novi Magazin".

The event was moderated by **Dr Dragan Štavljanin**, a journalist with Radio Free Europe in Prague.

In the second part of the conference, a series of other participants, who were invited to attend as guests, took part in the discussions, among them politicians and representatives of the Belgrade University, the civil sector and the media.

Part I

Panellists' Presentations

The Deepening of the Ukraine Crisis – Causes and Challenges

Dr Borys Bazylevsky

Ambassador Bazylevsky began his speech by saying that the Ukraine crisis is essentially a product of geostrategic thinking and that it is by no means an internal crisis or civil war, as it is often qualified in some media, but an act of violence by a neighbouring country against Ukraine, characterisable as aggression according to all international charters, and particularly the Charter of the United Nations (UN). He stressed that there are currently 43,000 heavily armed Russian troops in Ukraine. Russian armed forces have powerful artillery, tanks and other state-of-the-art weapons, unlike the Ukrainian army, which has to import weapons in order to be any kind of match for them.

Despite the negotiations that were conducted and ceasefires that were reached, the war is still far from over. **Although it may seem that the warfare has decreased in intensity and heavy artillery is officially not being used, these weapons have been noted to be used during night-time raids. The ceasefire is, hence, highly unstable.** Russia has annexed parts of Ukraine and is waging an undeclared war, but Kremlin is trying to hide this fact by stressing that Russia has no connection to the alleged "internal conflict" taking place in Ukraine proper. The official Kremlin spokesmen keep denying Kremlin's direct involvement in the annexation of Crimea and consequently reject all responsibility.

The situation in Ukraine is not merely a regional, but a global problem. The demise of the bipolar world did not bring a solution for Russian national interests, hence the paradox of Russia partaking as a mediator in many international processes, while simultaneously being a major threat to global stability due to its foreign policy agenda.

An attempt to answer the question of the main motive and incentive for the Russian elite in acting this way would yield two certain facts:

- a) ideological and moral weakness the elite's power rests on;
- b) the desire to enforce and demonstrate its power at all costs.

The international community is facing a challenge that consists in the fact that the global security system and its regional components, in their current state, cannot prevent the potential escalation of the Ukraine crisis. The UN Security Council itself is hampered in its reaction by the fact that Russia, one of its permanent members, wields veto power, while the OSCE lacks instruments to act. The international community has insufficient potential for coercion and inadequate instruments to force Russia to change its behaviour, either now or in the foreseeable future. The necessity for a change in the international system institutions and their functioning is becoming ever clearer. First and foremost, a move to majority decision-making in the Security Council is imperative, while the consensus decision-making at the OSCE should be abandoned. NATO as an organisation should return to collective security and **pay close attention** to applying the principles on which it was based to the current situation – Dr Bazylevsky concluded.

Another aggravating circumstance is the way people in Russia view this war. The Federation Council authorised the deployment of troops to Crimea, which means that Mr Putin practically has the permission of the state institutions for any further steps in this direction. Some research shows that Russians are proud of their role in the Ukrainian war. Ukraine is especially wary of the nuclear weapons Russia possesses, which makes some news – such as 65% of viewers of Moscow Channel 1 declaring that they would support a nuclear war if President Putin so decided – particularly unsettling.

Dr Bazylevsky expressed the opinion that there are 3 scenarios for resolving the conflict in Ukraine:

1. Reducing tensions: he stressed that he thought this scenario unlikely as long as Mr Putin is in power, considering his pretensions to occupy all of Ukraine;
2. Freezing the conflict: also an unlikely scenario, considering Russia's territorial pretensions.
3. Escalation of conflict: he thought this scenario to be the most likely.

Internal Developments in Ukraine Amid the Crisis

Pavlo Sheremeta

The former Ukrainian Minister of Economy and one of the leading new-generation economists, Mr Pavlo Sheremeta exposed his view of the internal causes for the escalation of the crisis. He said that corruption and human rights violations were the main and strongest incentive for a rebellion involving so many people in Ukraine. The maxim „Money over rights!“ applied in Ukraine even before the rebellion. The collapsing value system in Ukraine in a combination with democracy, rule of law and minority rights deficits open another possible front in the war – an internal war. Clearly it does not suffice to merely replace the people in power; it is the system itself and its processes that must be changed. Mr Sheremeta particularly stressed that merely bringing new people into the old system bears no results, because they are bound to either quit or adapt. He therefore believes that, if Ukraine wishes to face this issue and to overcome it, it must take several steps:

1. Create a legal framework that would regulate the internal economic system and facilitate business for companies;
2. Demonopolise the economy, foster the benefits of competition and provide free access to funds;
3. Carry out fiscal consolidation and reduce the deficit; this is the most difficult task, as there is a double deficit – both fiscal and trade.

The unresolved economic situation in the country results in devaluation and inflation, which currently stifle economic growth. Ukraine is receiving a fair amount of foreign aid, but not even an increased and permanent aid will suffice, unless the state itself takes the required steps.

There are, however, reasons for optimism, as the citizens are beginning to demand answers and political accountability. They exert pressure on government institutions to apply the principles and values of civil state, democracy, human and minority rights and rule of law.

They demand reforms because they know reforms are necessary, while being aware that the path will be long, painful and strenuous. Mr Sheremeta stressed, however, that it is vital that **there is an awareness that we must persevere on this path.**

Ukraine after Minsk II – Possible Developments

Viktor Zamiatin

Mr Zamiatin stated that the Ukraine situation can be compared to the nineties' Balkans conflicts, since it involves a conflict grounded in cultural and religious differences. It is a Russian aggression against Ukraine, in a specific form that is usually referred to as hybrid warfare. This type of warfare makes use of various means, such as paramilitary forces, regular Russian military forces wearing no insignia, as well as propaganda, diplomacy, manipulation of energy supplies etc. All these elements are used to weaken Ukrainian control of Donbass and undermine the very foundations of the Kiev Government.

As ambassador Bazylevsky already pointed out, there are three scenarios that were considered before the Minsk Protocol was signed:

- 1) gradually reducing tensions in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict;
- 2) freezing the conflict, which Mr Zamiatin believes to be a highly likely option after Minsk II;
- 3) further escalation of the conflict.

However, behind each scenario lies the question of what Russians are really planning to do with Ukraine? What is their goal? This no one can say with certainty for the time being. But Russian actions in Ukraine have brought about a deeper homogenization of Ukrainian citizens and a strengthening of a pro-Western orientation.

The public opinion polls conducted by the Razumkov Centre in 2014 yielded the following results:

- 34% of Ukrainian citizens expressed a positive opinion on the Minsk Protocol, while 20% assessed it as negative;
- More than half of Ukrainians support Ukraine's EU accession;
- For the first time in the poll's history, 50% of Ukrainians believe that Ukraine should join NATO;
- Most citizens believe that the Government should continue to take steps against terrorist groups in Donetsk and Luhansk;
- 17% believe that Ukraine should split up from the occupied, i.e. conflict—affected, regions.

Ukrainians for the most part no longer believe in the possibility of cooperation with Mr Putin, despite the fact that until recently most citizens believed that Ukraine had friendly ties with Russia. **This is no longer the case, mainly due to excess casualties of the war and the dire economic situation which Ukraine and Ukrainians are currently facing.**

This is the first time in history that Ukraine has faced this challenge, and the question is – how to react? **Granted, the biggest challenge is the ability of the Government to act and**

proceed with efficiency. There are grounds for optimism, as a new corps is being created within the society, oriented towards reform and political revival of the country.

Serbia and the Ukraine Crisis

Dr Ivan Vujačić

Ambassador Vujačić began his presentation by pointing out that, whenever Serbia's stance on the Ukraine crisis is discussed, two topics naturally come to mind: Serbia's specific position and its experience in the crisis in the former Yugoslavia.

Serbia's specific position stems from its striving for membership of the EU on the one hand, and its "special ties" with Russia on the other. Ambassador Vujačić stressed that there is nothing more deceiving than history, which has shown so many times to be subject to revision and re-interpretation, as is strikingly illustrated by Serbia's relationship with Russia. Throughout most of the twentieth century, Yugoslavia, and, as its constituent part, Serbia, had a troubled relationship with Russia. The examples of a good rapport and friendly gestures, such as tsar Nicholas II's support after Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia in 1914, are few and far between. And yet, people in Serbia strongly believe that Russians are their historic allies.

But this diverges from reality. Serbian foreign policy is mainly EU-oriented, which is not to say that Belgrade is about to introduce sanctions against Russia. Yet the halting of the South Stream project marks a watershed in Serbia's policy towards Russia. After it has become clear that the South Stream project will never come to fruition **and that Serbia has nothing to gain from it**, there has been a distinct cooling in the relationship (mainly reflected in the media coverage of Russia and the way it is represented). The cooling of the Serbian-Russian relationship occurred in a very short period of time, considering that Serbia recently organised a military parade to commemorate the 70-year anniversary of the liberation of Belgrade, with Vladimir Putin as its special guest.

Ambassador Vujačić stressed that Serbia's role as an OSCE presiding country is somewhat overplayed, as Serbia is a small country whose contribution to global politics is relatively limited. The Ukrainian problem, he concluded, will be definitely solved by big countries.

As concerns analogies, they are useful because they can bring to light the resemblances between individual cases, but the danger lies in the fact that large differences can also be perceived in apparently similar situations. Serbia's experience in the Yugoslav crisis calls to mind two clear analogies:

1. unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo and Crimea;
2. possible analogy between the Ukrainian and Bosnian conflicts, in terms of their resolution.

The question has been posed: what do Russians want? First and foremost, it is to prevent further expansion of NATO influence, probably some sort of federalisation of Ukraine without Crimea, and a rebuilding of ties with the EU. Ambassador Vujačić also expressed the opinion that it is highly likely that the EU will welcome such a solution. He argued that this would not be a bad path to take, if it followed along the general lines of the solutions applied in Bosnia.

Ukraine is currently forced to undertake drastic economic reforms, and the good times are nowhere in sight. What Ukraine should do and what it should insist on is to obtain economic aid from the EU, because the EU bears a large part of the responsibility for what happened, its preventive diplomacy having misfired.

Ukraine Crisis and EU's Position

Knut Fleckenstein

Mr Fleckenstein began his presentation by stating that no one knows what the future will bring. The most contentious issue at the moment, he argued, is whether the West should deliver arms to Ukraine. In his view the answer would have to be negative, except in one of the following three cases:

- a) If this could really force Mr Putin to withdraw;
- b) If there was a possibility for Ukraine to prevail in the conflict;
- c) If there was no EU, and we were outside Europe, and there was no direct danger to us.

Russia is the aggressor in this crisis. If the EU insists on not delivering arms to Ukraine, it must also insist on maintaining all types of sanctions as well as introducing new and more efficient ones, if it wishes the Minsk agreement to bear fruit. The European Council and the Council on Foreign Relations should begin to act proactively instead of reactively as they have so far, and should insist on enforcing the provisions of the Minsk Protocol. Russian troops must leave Ukraine and withdraw the weapons, and effective border control must be established. The EU is aware of this being a complex issue and Serbia therefore has a great possibility to contribute to resolving it as an OSCE presiding country.

The question is often heard within the EU on whether sanctions are useful? There is no doubt that they are useful and effective, economic sanctions especially. In order to expand its influence, the Union must diversify its energy sources and reduce its reliance on Russian imports. Also, the EU must provide humanitarian aid to Ukraine, since the Ukraine crisis is not merely a security and military issue. A large number of refugees from Donbass and Luhansk represent an additional challenge for the authorities in Kiev, and the EU should show solidarity. We must not fall victim to the misconception that there is an alternative to diplomacy. Quite the contrary, diplomatic solutions must be pursued resolutely.

In addition, economic aid to Ukraine should be increased, all the while keeping in mind that no one will give money to a country that shows no intention of reforming the system.

What is the final solution as concerns the relationship with Russia? Mr Fleckenstein believes that no one in the EU can answer that question, and poses another, more important one – what are the reasons for such changes in the Russian President's behaviour?

As concerns the Serbian-Russian relationship, Mr Fleckenstein expressed a belief that the traditional friendship between Serbia and Russia could play an important role in the context of Serbia's accession to the EU. It would be good for the EU to have among its members a state such as Serbia, which has friendly ties with and is close to Russia.

Yet, he emphasised, in the context of the current Ukrainian situation, he finds it incomprehensible that Serbia conducts joint military exercises with Russia and maintains other types of cooperation.

Part II

Discussion

The second part of the conference was conceived as a discussion under the Chatham House Rule. The following text will not quote the participants' identity or gender (due to the composition of the speakers, discussants and other participants). As already stated, the audience took an active part in the discussion. The discussion focused on several topics opened during the panellists' presentations: the West's position on Ukraine; arms export and economic aid; Ukraine crisis, Western Balkans and Serbia; further intentions of the Russian President, Mr Vladimir Putin; and, finally, possible solutions to the Ukraine crisis.

West's Position on Ukraine Arms Export and Economic Aid

The discussion began by a debate on whether the West should export arms to Ukraine to help put a speedy end to the conflict. One of the Ukrainian participants stressed that Ukraine needs state-of-the-art weapons, which would help save many lives. In his view, the current Ukrainian forces are the remnants of Soviet Union's military capacities, which explains why Russia occupied Crimea with such ease. With advanced weaponry, the Ukrainian authorities would be able to prevent raids by armed groups and their operation in the country's territory. Also, he highlighted, these would be defensive, not offensive, weapons allowing Ukraine to defend itself against outside aggression.

Another participant from Ukraine went on to say that, from a rational point of view, Ukraine needs to modernise its army and weaponry, and this process will surely take place, as Ukraine must try to protect its territory by all possible means. He underlined that the trend of enhancing conventional capabilities is present all over Eastern Europe, including the Member States of the EU. By signing the Budapest Memorandum in 1994 Ukraine renounced its nuclear arsenal in exchange for a guarantee of territorial sovereignty. However the Memorandum is effectively no longer in force and Ukraine and Ukrainians have been left to their own devices.

One of the Serbian participants expressed a belief that the West will not export arms to Ukraine as this would only deepen the conflict, which is against the EU's interests. He then noted that Ukraine is in a very specific position, being geographically located between two large stakeholders, the EU and Russia, which are in many ways dependent on one another. As concerns the USA, he said that it is much easier to discuss the provision of arms to Ukraine in the Congress, but that the President must act with more caution. It is therefore no coincidence that Mr Barack Obama agrees with Angela Merkel on the issue of arming Ukraine. The same participant expressed a belief that there will be no arms deliveries under this or a future administration for the simple reason that this would make the escalation of the conflict even likelier, with unpredictable consequences.

Another participant from Kiev stated that it was nonetheless necessary to arm Ukraine. He said that it was no secret that Ukraine is trying to acquire high-performance ballistic weapons. Since Russia can only be pressured into leaving Ukraine by means of weapons, he believes that Ukraine should be supplied with weapons in the near future. The USA is currently deliberating sending aid in weapons to Ukraine, but the consequences of procrastination could

be catastrophic, for the Western countries as well. The reaction, he said, must be consistent with the actual threat Mr Putin poses and the weaponry he has.

A civil society representative from Belgrade who attended the conference expressed a doubt that weapons of mass destruction in themselves could bring any major change. People in Ukraine, he said, probably feel the same as the Serbs did at the time [of the Balkans conflicts] – that they have been betrayed by their traditional allies.

One of the participants from the audience asked whether Ukraine had considered asking Serbia for weapons, and whether fighters from Serbia who went to fight in Ukraine would be convicted.

One of the participants close to the processes in Serbia's executive institutions replied that he did not know whether Ukraine had ever asked Serbia for weapons, but considering the significantly increased budget, there will certainly be a possibility to do that in the future. He also stated that Serbian citizens fighting in Ukraine on the separatist side (there are currently 20 to 30 of them on record) will certainly be convicted if they come back to Serbia, and their property will be confiscated.

A Serbian participant drew the attendees' attention to a statement by an EU official, who said that Ukraine will not become part of the Union even in the medium term, and that it will not be sufficiently financially supported to overcome the economic crisis. He stressed that a review of the EU budget for the period until 2020 reveals that not more than EUR 1bn has been earmarked for Ukraine and the recovery of its economy. This amount is insufficient; according to some estimates, Ukraine needs at least EUR 12bn to relieve the current situation. Thus the delivery of weapons is not the only relevant issue; the economic situation in Ukraine and economic recovery are just as important.

The participant emphasised that the Ukrainian crisis has shown the importance of security issues in Europe, and of the essential principles on which the EU is based. These events have brought the issue of security in Europe back to the negotiating table.

Ukraine crisis, Western Balkans and Serbia

One of the participants from Belgrade asked how the Ukraine crisis affects the Western Balkans. Since the situation in Ukraine requires the Union's full attention, it does not leave much room for considerations on the position and goings-on in the Western Balkans and the enlargement process itself. As far as Serbia is concerned, it can be certain of its presiding of the OSCE. The participant stressed that Serbia's presidency of the OSCE is sandwiched between Germany's and Switzerland's and that the policy within the organisation must be driven by the awareness that it is large countries that are in charge of the dialogue in Ukraine.

One of the attending members of the diplomatic corps in Belgrade highlighted the fact that over EUR 3bn has been invested into Serbia since 2001. On the other hand, he stressed that Russia did not invest in Serbia nearly as much. It is interesting to see that people in Serbia perceive Russia as Serbia's largest donor, when in reality Russia's contribution is very modest. What should be worked on in Serbia, he concluded, is developing a rational, rather than emotional, approach to foreign policy.

In his response, a participant from Belgrade supported the position that the relationship between Russia and Serbia is not defined by economics, and what connects them is not economic gain. The issues raised around the South Stream pipeline, the hike in gas prices and other events that took place plainly showed that the Serbian-Russian relationship is not based on economics, as they did not result in a recession of Russian influence in Serbia. The same participant stated that Serbia did not impose sanctions on Russia because Serbian public is not ready to accept that. Serbia's policy towards Ukraine mainly depends on its policy towards Russia, not its relationship with the EU.

Another participant from Belgrade stressed that the historic connection to Russia was never played up as much as it has been since Mr Slobodan Milošević came to power. In fact, it is with him that the discourse on the closeness with Russia began to be served to the public. The current state is largely due to the fact that Serbia was bombed in a Western intervention, followed by recognition of Kosovo's independence by most Western countries. This is one of the reasons why Russians are perceived as closer allies than they actually are, which best reflects the emotional involvement in the Serbian-Russian relationship.

One of the Serbian civil society representatives reminded that an important parallel between the Yugoslav and Ukrainian crises is reflected in the fact that the responsibility for a conflict you find yourself involved in does not necessarily lie with you, but has to do with other issues in international relations.

Another participant from Belgrade expressed a belief that the Kosovo issue is losing its urgency and that it is no longer a part of the principal, or even a secondary discussion. Russia and Serbia do not give much importance to economics and economic ties, but rather political and religious ones. Kosovo was therefore instrumental to their goals. The belief that Russia was "watching Serbia's back" at the UN Security Council thanks to its veto right over the Kosovo issue was long considered the biggest "gift" Russia could give us. But it seems that this fact is losing some of its punch nowadays, and is maybe even being marginalised, said the participant.

A civil society representative raised the issue of whether the current Ukraine crisis is comparable to the one in Bosnia, knowing that the international community had ended up changing its mind and delivering arms to Bosnia, although it rejected the idea at first. Can the same scenario be expected to be repeated in Ukraine?

A participant from Belgrade thought that the Ukrainian situation cannot be compared with the one in Bosnia, mainly because the politicians in Bosnia actually believed that a third world war would break out over a couple of inconsequential hills. The difference is that this conflict is taking place on the Russian border, which was not the case with Bosnia; this gives it additional strength and makes it more of a threat. This is why the West will not deliver arms to Ukraine under any circumstances.

„What does Mr Putin want?“

One of the Serbian participants noted that each conflict is unique and has its specificities, but that there are certain lessons history teaches us that we should not overlook. The West should really not be expected to arm Ukraine, because the Western countries do not want to see the conflict escalate even further. According to this debate participant, Ukrainians must face

reality and accept the simple fact that, unfortunately, no country is prepared to carry Ukraine on its back. Another reality is that no one wants to upset Russia too much, as other Russia's neighbours can attest. According to this participant, Mr Putin and Russia got what they wanted: Crimea.

One of the Ukrainian participants replied that no one can guarantee Ukraine that Mr Putin will stop at Crimea; the majority of Ukrainian elite believes that he wants more than that and that Crimea is just a first step.

Another Ukrainian participant reminded that Mr Putin enjoys great support of the Russian electorate, currently around 85%, and that a major challenge he is facing is to preserve this support. One option would be Russia's economic prosperity, but clearly this option has been squandered through the orientation towards energy export. Another alternative are foreign policy moves in the "national interest", such as the annexation of Crimea. But will the Russian President stop at that? The participant thought that nobody can know what Russia's intentions are. It is, however, certain that the Budapest Protocol is no longer in force, that Ukraine should no longer rely on it and should prepare itself for all kinds of outcomes.

Commenting on Mr Vladimir Putin's intentions, one of the diplomatic corps representatives quoted a German poet: *Look not at his mouth (what he says), but his fist.*

What scares the citizens and the elite in Kiev is the possibility that Mr Putin is considering extending Russia's borders to match the XVIII century ones, said one of the Ukrainian participants. He expressed his conviction that this stems from the fact that Russia is surrounded by democracies, which is making it uncomfortable. Mr Putin uses propaganda in his rhetoric and his position on the Ukraine crisis, and it has worked well for him so far. But we should not exclude the possibility that precisely this reliance on propaganda could turn against him and cost him his position, he concluded.

What are the possible solutions to the Ukraine crisis?

A participant from Kiev estimated that the crisis is highly likely to develop into an even larger conflict. He stressed that the only valid solution is what Ukrainians stand for and took to the streets to fight for: democracy, human rights and the rule of law. It is important to reiterate, he said, that Ukraine renounced nuclear arms in exchange for independence and territorial integrity. The solution lies in going back to these values: the citizens should be able to decide themselves on who is to lead them, what language they wish to use, what kind of educational system they want, and all other matters. In this sense, he said, the minorities should also be allowed their say on these issues according to the same principles.

Another Ukrainian participant agreed and confirmed that respect for democratic principles is a necessary ingredient of a permanent solution to the crisis. But how to make Russia accept such a solution?

A media representative said that it was still impossible to foresee how long the Minsk Agreement would remain in force, but even a frozen conflict is better than an all-out war, he added.

A participant from Belgrade thought that two new Nagorno-Karabakhs in the east of Ukraine are inevitable. Any proposal put forth by the Russians, such as federalisation, will most likely be unacceptable for Kiev. But, he claims, in 30 years' time Kiev will know that rejecting federalisation had been a big mistake. The same participant hoped that Ukraine would avoid this scenario, with which Serbia is permanently faced – always fretting about its past mistakes.

Another Serbian participant recommended that Ukraine try and secure a ceasefire, decentralise the eastern part of the country and request economic aid from the EU. Reforms will certainly be difficult to pass, and that is why Ukraine should request aid, mainly economic, from the EU.